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MERGING THE SEC AND CFTC-A CLASH OF CULTURES
Jerry W. Markham*

I. INTRODUCTION

The massive subprime losses at Citigroup, UBS, Bank of America,
Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and other banks astounded the financial
world. Equally shocking were the failures of Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, and Bear Steams. The conversion of Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies left no large independent
investment banks standing. If all that was not enough, Bernard
Madoff's incredible $50 billion Ponzi scheme was a new milestone in
the nation's financial history. Those failures and Madoffs fraud were
unforeseen and undetected by the regulator, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which was responsible for overseeing the brokerdealers that failed and monitoring the investment advisers such as
Madoff. That once-proud agency seemed helpless and hapless in the
face of the subprime crisis, during which the investment banks it
regulated lost hundreds of billions of dollars, threatening the entire
economy.' Although those debacles touched the very core of the SEC's
regulatory role, it appeared clueless of the risks that the country's largest
and most venerable investment banks undertook in subprime-related
transactions. The SEC was completely surprised by the failures of Bear
Steams and Lehman Brothers. It was equally surprised by the Madoff
fraud, despite several warnings that Madoff s reported profits were
unrealistic. 2
The derivatives counterpart to the SEC, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), was also under fire from the press and
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1. Of course the investment banks were not the only ones reporting massive losses. The
American International Group, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, homebuilders, and automakers were all
posting massive losses that contributed to a panic in the markets and a declining economy. In addition
to a damaged housing market, GDP dropped by 6.2% on an annualized basis in the fourth quarter of
2008, the sharpest drop since the recession in 1982. New unemployment claims were being filed at a
rate of 600,000 per week in February 2009. Conor Dougherty & Kelly Evans, Economy in Worst Fall
Since '82, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at Al. The unemployment rate in the United States reached 8.5%
in March 2009. Floyd Norris, U.S. Jobless Rate Likely to Pass Europe's, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2009, at
B3. The unemployment rate in California went above 11% in May 2009. Paul Krugman, State of
Paralysis,N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at A19.
2. See infra notes 136-147 and accompanying text.
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Congress in 2008 for its inability to control volatile commodity prices.
Those price fluctuations were widely believed, without proof, to be
caused by speculators acting with impunity in the commodity markets.3
Prices exploded to $147.27 a barrel in 2008, 4 pushing gasoline prices to
over $4 a gallon in July 2008, 5 before dropping back to about $37 in
February 2009.6 Widespread concerns were also raised about the
transparency of the over-the-counter derivatives (OTC derivatives)
markets that had been largely deregulated by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000.7
Some of the criticism of the SEC and CFTC is not justified. These
two agencies were not responsible for the spike in commodity prices or
the residential housing bubble. But the public has lost confidence in
their ability to regulate markets because they have proved unable to
deter or detect fraud. As the subprime crisis exploded, exposing the
shortcomings of these agencies, the Treasury Department was
considering its "Blueprint" for regulatory reform.8
Among the
Blueprint's wide-ranging proposals was a recommendation for
combining the CFTC and SEC into a single financial services regulator. 9
This Article addresses that proposal.' 0
II. THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT
A. Competition Concerns
Responding to widespread concerns over overlapping and
unnecessary regulation in the existing regulatory structure, thenSecretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr. launched an initiative in

3. See infra notes 255-73 and accompanying text.
4. S&P 500 Drops Into Bear Market, WASH. POST, July 13, 2008, at F6.
5. Id.
6. Crude Oil PricesFall Below $37 a Barrel,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B 1.
7. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763 *codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
I1, 12,& 15 u.S.C.).
8. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf[hereinafter
TREASURY BLUEPRINT].
9. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 106-11.
10. The author previously considered this issue in Jerry W. Markham, Super-Regulator: A
ComparativeAnalysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, Great Britain &
Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 375-78 (2003) [hereinafter Super-Regulator]. Much water has
passed over the dam since that article was published. The subject certainly deserves to be revisited in
light of the Treasury Blueprint and the events that have unfolded during the subprime crisis.
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October 2007 to consider how those concerns might be alleviated."
The backdrop for that study was a widely expressed concern that
excessive regulation in the United States was undermining the nation's
competitive position in the world. Before the subprime crisis reached its
peak, even politicians normally in favor of regulation were advocating a
roll back of at least some aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate
Reform Act of 2002 (SOX). 12

New York Senator Charles Schumer coauthored an op-ed in the Wall
Street Journal with New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg that
called for a study to determine if New York was losing its position as the
world's leading financial center because of over-regulation and abusive
shareholder litigation.' 3 The resulting study stated that its findings
were:
[Q]uite clear: First, our regulatory framework is a thicket of complicated
rules, rather than a streamlined set of commonly understood principles, as
is the case in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The flawed
implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which produced
far heavier costs than expected, has only aggravated the situation, as has
the continued requirement that foreign companies conform to U.S.
accounting standards rather than the widely accepted-many would say
superior-international standards. The time has come not only to reexamine implementation of SOX, but also to undertake broader reforms,
using a principles-based approach to eliminate duplication and
inefficiencies in our regulatory system. And we must do both while
ensuring that we maintain our strong protections for investors and
consumers.
Second, the legal environments in other nations, including Great
Britain, far more effectively discourage frivolous litigation. While nobody
should attempt to discourage suits with merit, the prevalence of meritless
securities lawsuits and settlements in the U.S. has driven up the apparent
and actual cost of business-and driven away potential investors. In
addition, the highly complex and fragmented nature of our legal system
has led to a perception that penalties are arbitrary and unfair, a reputation
that may be overblown, but nonetheless diminishes our attractiveness to
international companies. To address this, we must consider legal reforms
that will reduce spurious and meritless litigation and eliminate 1the
perception of arbitrary justice, without eliminating meritorious actions. 4
11. Request for Comments, Review by the Treasury Department of the Regulatory Structure
Associated With Financial Institutions, 72 Fed. Reg. 58,939 (Oct. 17, 2007).
12. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29

u.s.c.).
13. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From London,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18.
14. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTANING NEW YORK'S AND THE US
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Efforts to reform the reforms continued with a 2007 report from the

blue ribbon Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR), which
found that excessive regulation was hurting the securities markets and
making foreign markets more competitive. The CCMR concluded that
the United States' competitive position in financial services was
"seriously eroding" and had "deteriorated significantly" in recent
years. 15 The CCMR U.S. share of global initial public offerings (IPOs)
by foreign companies also significantly declined between 1996 and
2007. In 2007, only about 10% of such foreign based IPOs were listed
on a U.S. exchange, in contrast to 44.5% in 1996.16
In 1996, eight of the twenty largest global IPOs were listed on a U.S.
exchange. In 2006, only one such offering was listed on a U.S.
exchange, and foreign firms delisting from U.S. exchanges set a record
that year. Statistics also evidenced that foreign firms were turning to
unregulated private offerings when they sought to raise funds in the
United States. IPOs by U.S. companies abroad also significantly
increased.' 7 The CCMR recommended that Congress decrease the
burden of regulation and litigation in order to make the United States
more competitive. The Committee predicted that within ten years,
unless its recommended changes were made, the United States would no
longer be the financial capital of the world. 18
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce appointed a bipartisan, independent
commission, which issued a report that also raised concerns with
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP ii (2007).
15. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC

EQUITY MARKET v, 1 (2007).
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 2. Only 5% of the top 20 global initial public offerings in 2006 were listed in the
United States, down from 60% five years earlier. The United States raised only 28% of global equity in
2006, down from 41% in 1995. Hot Topic: Is Wall Street Losing Its Competitive Edge?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 2, 2006, at A6. As Peter Wallison, a Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, also noted:
Between 1996 and 2001, the New York Stock Exchange averaged 50 new non-U.S.
listings annually; in 2005, it was 19. In the same year, the London Stock Exchange,
including its small company affiliate, the Alternative Investment Market, gained 139 new
listings while Nasdaq attracted 19. Since the end of 2004, 30 foreign companies have left
the NYSE and Nasdaq. Financial capital-the kind that finances mergers, acquisitions
and new business formation-is also increasingly finding a more comfortable home
abroad. Large offerings by Chinese, Korean and Russian companies-involving billions
of dollars-have occurred in Hong Kong and London; meanwhile, large new foreign
offerings this year by Russian aluminum producers and Kazakhstan oil and copper
companies are planning to list in London.
Peter J. Wallison, Capital Punishment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2006, at A7. The number of foreign
delistings increased to 56 in 2007, almost double that of the year before and over four times the amount
in 1997. Editorial, The Other Market Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2007, at A18.
18. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 15.
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unnecessary regulation. That commission found that "[i]n recent years,
the U.S. has experienced a steady decline in its share of the global
capital markets activity as international financial centers have grown to
challenge this historical dominance."1 9 Another report by the Financial
Services Roundtable noted:
Effective regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets
and firms are vital to consumers, capital formation, job creation, and
sustained economic growth. Consumers of all kinds-small savers, firsttime homebuyers, college students, small businesses and medium-sized
enterprises, large corporations, issuers, investors, pension funds, and even
governments-benefit when markets are safe, stable, and secure as well
as when they are vibrant and innovative, and financial services firms
actively compete for their business. Today, financial services firms
directly account for five percent of total US
employment, and eight
20
(GDP).
product
domestic
gross
U.S.
of
percent
The Roundtable's report urged the adoption of principles-based
regulation (as opposed to the current rules-based methodology) that
would be risk-based, cost-effective, and standard across the same
financial markets. The authors of the report included James Dimon,
Chief Executive Officer of J.P. Morgan Chase, and Richard Kovacevich,
Chairman of Wells Fargo--two banks that would be deeply involved in
the subprime crisis as rescuers of failing institutions. 2 '
B. FunctionalRegulation
Reform is sorely needed. The United Sates now operates under a
"functional" regulatory system. Under this system, different regulators
are appointed to regulate particular financial services, even if those
services are offered by the same firm. This has resulted in much overlap
and regulatory conflict, and created a system that failed to anticipate the
subprime crisis. That the functional regulatory system failed should not
be a surprise. It is a haphazard system of regulation that is not the result
of a design or reasoned blueprint. 22 Rather, it is a set of accumulated

19. COMM'N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2007).
20. FINANCIAL SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS 3

(2007).
21. See id.

22. The Treasury study was the first effort to undertake a comprehensive review of financial
services regulation in the United States since the 1984 report by the Task Group on Regulation of
Financial Services that was headed by then Vice President George H.W. Bush. Its members included
Donald T. Regan, Treasury Secretary and former Merrill Lynch CEO, the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, representatives from the Attorney General's office, the Office of Management and
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responses to a long history of financial crises, scandals, happenstance,
personalities, and compromises among a broad and competing array of
industry and governmental bodies.2 3
Under functional regulation, financial service firms are regulated by
fifty state insurance commissioners acting collectively through the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), fifty state
securities commissioners (plus the District of Columbia) acting
collectively through the North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA), fifty state attorneys general who operate in wolf
packs when attacking financial service firms, and fifty state bank
regulators. Union pension funds support that cast by acting as "private
attorneys general" in bringing class action lawsuits whenever a company
announces bad news.
At the federal level, functional regulators include the Federal Reserve
Board (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the
Treasury Department (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Treasury
Department's anti-money laundering group (FinCEN), and the Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), which is also in the Treasury
Department and handles financial embargoes imposed on troublesome
countries. The Justice Department, together with the FBI and Postal
Inspectors, has also become a financial services regulator by
criminalizing bad corporate decision making. In addition, the SEC,
CFTC, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Occupational Safety & Health
Agency (OSHA) (for SOX whistleblower claims), and self-regulatory
bodies such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
Budget, and the heads of several agencies responsible for regulating financial services. The Bush task
force concluded that financial services in the United States were the "central nervous system of the
economy" and that this industry was suffering from too much regulation. The Bush task force
recommended reducing federal bank regulators from three to two, creating a new Federal Banking
Agency in the Treasury Department and reducing financial services regulators. U.S. TASK GROUP ON
REGULATION OF FIN. SERVS.

BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON

REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 (1984). Those recommendations were not implemented.
Instead, in 1999, Congress embraced "functional" regulation in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15, 16
U.S.C.), which repealed the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). See LISA
L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, CASES

AND MATERIALS 239-40 (3d edition 2008) (discussing functional regulation).
Still another study, this one entitled FinancialInstitutions and the Nation 's Economy (FINE),
was undertaken by the House Committee on Banking Currency and Housing in 1975. FINE
recommended that all depository institutions be regulated by a single regulator, a recommendation ahead
of its time. See generally Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy (Fine) "Discussion
Principles": Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. lnsts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the
Comm. on Banking, Currency & Hous., 94th Cong. (1975).
23. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liability Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 424,
436 n.75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting the author).
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and National Futures Association (NFA) regulate various aspects of the
financial services industry.
C. Treasury Report
In 2006, Treasury Secretary Paulson warned that the country was
"creating a thicket of regulation that impedes competitiveness. ' '24 The
Treasury Department sought public comment on regulatory efficiency
issues in its study on the flaws in functional regulation. Of particular
interest was the Department's request for comment on whether the
"increasing convergence of products across the traditional 'functional'
regulatory lines of banking, insurance, securities, and futures" justifies
changes in the regulatory system to ensure that regulatory boundary
lines do not unnecessarily inhibit competition.25 The Department
received more than 350 letters in response, indicating the financial
community's interest. 26 The Treasury Department published its report
in March 2008 (Treasury Blueprint).27
The study that led to the Treasury Blueprint was commenced at a time
when inefficient regulation was thought to be impairing financial
services. Even while the Treasury study was ongoing, however, a sea
change was occurring as the subprime crisis arose and intensified. The
Wall Street Journal declared in a front-page article on March 24, 2008,
that a new era of increased regulation could be expected due to problems
in the subprime market. 28 The Treasury Blueprint, which recommended
a broad restructuring of the chaotic financial services regulatory
structure, was published a few days after the Wall Street Journal
article. 29 It sought more centralized and rational regulation because of
concern that functional regulation was ineffective and was undermining
America's traditional competitive advantage in financial services. 30 The
24. Deborah Solomon, Treasury's Paulson Warns of the Costs of Rules Overlap, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 21, 2006, at A2.
25. Request for Comments, Review by the Treasury Department of the Regulatory Structure
Associated With Financial Institutions, 72 Fed. Reg. 58,939, 58,940 (Oct. 17, 2007).
26. David G. Nason, U.S. Treasury Assistant Sec'y for Fin. lnsts., Remarks Before the City of
London Corporation: Redesigning U.S. Financial Regulation for a Global Marketplace (Dec. 11,2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp726.htm.
27. See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8.

28. Elizabeth Williamson, PoliticalPendulum Swings Toward Stricter Regulation, WALL ST. J.
Mar. 24, 2008, at Al.
29. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8.

30. The Blueprint noted:
Due to its sheer dominance in the global capital markets, the U.S. financial services
industry for decades has been able to manage the inefficiencies in its regulatory structure
and still maintain its leadership position. Now, however, maturing foreign financial
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Treasury Blueprint prophetically found that functional regulation:
exhibit[ed] several inadequacies, the most significant being the fact that
no single regulator possesses all of the information and authority
necessary to monitor systemic risk, or the potential that events associated
with financial institutions may trigger broad dislocation or a series of
defaults that affect the financial system so significantly that the real
economy is adversely affected.3 '
The Blueprint contrasted the functional regulatory approach in
America with regulatory mechanisms abroad. England, Germany,
Japan, and dozens of other countries use a single consolidated regulator,
along with a central bank, to regulate; those countries eschew the "rulesbased" approach used by most of the most regulators in the United
States. 32 Rather, foreign regulators use a "principles-based" approach
that sets broad regulatory goals and permits the industry to decide how
to meet those goals. A principles-based approach reduces the need for
volumes of regulations that seek to control every aspect of financial
services operations-which is the approach taken by the SEC. The SEC
has an institutional culture that seeks to dictate every aspect of corporate
behavior.
In contrast, the CFTC administers a principles-based
regulatory structure put in place by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000.13
D. The FinancialServices Authority
Before the subprime crisis, the Financial Services Authority (FSA),
Great Britain's single regulator, was a model for regulatory agencies
around the world. That agency was created after earlier regulatory
reform efforts in London failed.34 The FSA was given regulatory
authority over all financial services in the U.K., and in the process,
assumed the duties of nine other regulatory bodies. In so doing, Great
Britain abolished self-regulatory organizations.3 5 Among other things,
markets and their ability to provide alternate sources of capital and financial innovation
in a more efficient and modem regulatory system are pressuring the U.S. financial
services industry and its regulatory structure.
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 2.

31. Id. at4.
32. Id. at 141.
33. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12,& 15 U.S.C.).
34. For a description of the background that led to the creation of the FSA, see Super-Regulator,
supra note 10, at 375-78.
35. The FSA was a mixture of private and government initiative:
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is an independent non-governmental body, given
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the FSA consolidated six separate insurance funds for compensating
36
investors who suffer losses from failed financial institutions into one.
The FSA also merged fourteen separate rulebooks governing various
financial activities into one.3 7
The single rulebook approach taken by the FSA was appealing, at
least compared with the multitude of regulators in the United States.
FSA regulation, at least initially, appeared successful. Despite the
reduced regulation under the FSA, Great Britain was spared the Enronera scandals that occurred under functional regulation in the United
States. Critics contended that the FSA was understaffed and remained a
weak regulator that deferred to the industry. Critics also argued that
FSA unified regulations still imposed significant costs. Indeed,
principles-based regulation under the FSA still required many rules, and
the FSA handbook, which consolidated the
rulebooks of earlier
38
regulators, still totaled more than 8,000 pages.
The FSA also had controversial powers. It could veto decisions by
large financial institutions to hire executives with "significant
influence." The FSA also had authority to monitor the performance of
such executives through regular reviews and was authorized to require
an executive be fired if its appraisal was negative. 39 Additionally, the
FSA interviewed and approved hiring senior executives at "high-impact"
firms.4 0 This meant, of course, that financial institutions had to kowtow
to their regulators because if, for any reason, they displeased the FSA,
their executives could be fired.
A favorable impression of FSA regulation was created after it adopted

statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. We are a company
limited by guarantee and financed by the financial services industry. The Treasury
appoints the FSA Board, which currently consists of a Chairman, a Chief Executive
Officer, two Managing Directors, and ten non-executive directors (including a lead nonexecutive member, the Deputy Chairman). This Board sets our overall policy, but dayto-day decisions and management of the staff are the responsibility of the Executive.
Fin. Servs. Auth., Who are we, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last visited Feb.
19, 2010).
36. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 18 (2001),

available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsa intro.pdf.
37. Super-Regulator,supra note 10, at 379-80.
38. 23 JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, CREDIT REGULATION, AND

CUSTOMER PROTECTION § 2A: 10 (2009).
39. Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA consults on changes to the rules for approved persons,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2008/153.shtml (last visited on January 9,
2009).
40. Fin.
Servs.
Auth.,
Approved
persons
and
appointed
representatives,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Regulated/Approved/index.shtml (last visited on January 9, 2009).
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a unified approach to capital requirements and risk management. 4 1 That
program, however, proved to be an empty shell during the subprime
crisis in 2007. The FSA was also strongly criticized for failing to
prevent a bank run on Northern Rock PLC during the subprime crisis,
the first run on a bank in England in more than 100 years. The English
government nationalized that bank and put up $30 billion to rescue it
and stop the panic.42 The British government also
rescued the Royal
43
Bank of Scotland and Lloyds at a tremendous CoSt.

After that series of events, Great Britain sought to enhance the FSA's
powers and to make its regulation more intrusive. 44 In January 2008,
the House of Commons Treasury Committee issued a report criticizing
the FSA for its laxness in regulating Northern Rock. The report asserted
that the FSA failed to allocate sufficient resources to monitor the bank
whose "business model was so clearly an outlier. '' 45 The committee
recommended that the Bank of England be the lead regulator when a
bank faces financial difficulties. That recommendation was an apparent
effort to turn back the clock on the single regulator concept, which had
given the Bank of England's regulatory authority to the FSA because of
perceived inadequacies in the Bank of England's regulatory abilities.
The FSA promised more stringent regulation in March 2009. It head,
Hector Sants, also vowed that London would no longer be friendly to the
financial services industry and that he intended to take strong action to
assure that the business community would be "frightened" of the FSA.46
The FSA's proposals included a regulatory wish list of massively
increased capital requirements for banks, and closer scrutiny of their
business models, products, and compensation schemes; the FSA also

41.

FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS: COMMON PLATFORM FOR

FIRMS (2006), availableat http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp06_09.pdf.
42. Julie Werdigier, A Nationalized Northern Rock CurtailsIts Products as Deposits Surge, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008 at C7.
43. Landon Thomas, Jr., British Bank Adapts to Life On a Leash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at
BI. The U.K. government effectively nationalized the Royal Bank of Scotland, which suffered the
largest ever quarterly loss by any company in the history of the U.K. in 2008. Sara Schaefer Mufioz et
al., U.K., U.S. Expand Bank Rescue Bids, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at Al.
44. Julia Werdigier, Slump Could Mirror 1990s, British Regulator Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2008, at C7. Sir James Crosby, the deputy chairman of the FSA, was forced to resign on February 11,
2009 after it was revealed that he had ignored warnings from a the risk manager at HBOS PLC while
employed as the chief executive officer of HBOS PLC. That bank was later bailed out by the British
government. Sara Schaefer Muiioz, Under Fire, a Top U.K. Watchdog Quits Post, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,
2009, at C3.
45. Richard Fletcher, Forking out more to the financial regulatormay not be money well spent,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 18, 2008, at 31.
46. Peter Thal Larsen, Gloves to Come Off as FSA Ends "Light Touch " Era, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 13, 2009, at 17.
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proposed regulation of credit rating agencies and hedge funds. 47 FSA
chairman Lord Turner weighed in with a 122-page report in March 2009
that also advocated abandoning London's light-touch regulation. He
wanted to impose restrictions that would limit excessive risks taken by
banks through increased capital liquidity measures. Lord Turner also
sought a pan-European regulatory body.48
Nonetheless, the single regulator concept was losing its luster. For
example, a European Union panel considering structural changes in its
financial services regulation in the wake of the subprime crisis did not
seem interested in a single regulator. 49 The conservative party in the
U.K. was also advocating a "twin peaks" regulatory approach that was
also under consideration in the United States.5 °
E. Twin Peaks
In seeking to abandon functional regulation, the Treasury Blueprint
did not advocate a single regulator system for the United States. The
Blueprint rejected a single regulator model for many reasons:
While the consolidated regulator approach can deliver a number of
benefits, several potential problems also arise. First, housing all
regulatory functions related to financial and consumer regulation in one
entity may lead to varying degrees of focus on these key functions.
Limited synergies in terms of regulation associated with financial and
consumer protection may lead the regulator to focus more on one over the
other. There may also be difficulties in allocating resources to these
functions. Second, a consolidated regulatory approach to financial
oversight might also lead to less market discipline as the same regulator
would regulate all financial institutions, whether or not they have explicit
government guarantees. This would seem to be particularly important in
the United States where a number of financial institutions have access to
explicit government guarantees of varying degrees.
Third, since
regulatory reform must consider the role of the central bank, the
consolidated regulatory approach must maintain some degree of close
coordination with the central bank if the central bank is going to be
ultimately responsible for some aspect of market stability. The United
Kingdom's recent experience with Northern Rock highlights the
importance of this function in the consolidated regulator approach.

47. Julia Werdigier, British Regulator Takes a Tougher Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at B8.
48. Peter Thai Larsen et al., Turner to End Light-Touch Regulation, FT.COM (Fin. Times), Mar.
18, 2009, availableat http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68397782-13b7-1 Ide-9e32-0000779fd2ac.html.
49. Alistair MacDonald, Financial Regulatory System Gets Overhaul Suggestions, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 26, 2009, at A8.
50. Larsen, supra note 46, at 17.
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Finally, the scale of operations necessary to establish a single
consolidated regulator in the United States could make the
51 model more
difficult to implement in comparison to other jurisdictions.
Instead of a single regulator, the Blueprint recommended that the
United States adopt the "twin peaks" approach used in Australia and the
Netherlands.52 This concept is attributed to Michael Taylor, a former
official at the Bank of England who wrote a 1995 article entitled 'Twin
Peaks': A Regulatory Structurefor the New Century.53 The Twin Peaks
approach is objectives-based and focuses on specific regulatory goals.
Twin Peaks envisions a central bank that focuses on prudential
supervision, and a single business practices regulator that focuses on
business conduct and consumer protection. From this the Treasury
Blueprint created a "Three Peaks" approach that would have three
separate bodies implementing three specific regulatory goals: (1) market
stability regulation, (2) prudential financial regulation, and (3) business
conduct regulation. This objectives-based approach would require
consolidating and reshuffling the existing functional regulators in the
United States into essentially three principal regulators. The market
stability regulator would be the Federal Reserve Board. A new agency
would be created for prudential financial regulation that would regulate
financial institutions with a government guarantee, such as banks
insured by the FDIC and broker-dealers insured by the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). A new agency would also have
to be created for the business conduct regulator, which would create and
apply principles-based regulation.54
The Treasury Blueprint recommended that in the interim, the SEC
and CFTC be merged. It also recommended that the SEC adopt a
principles-based regulatory approach, like that of the CFTC, to make the
merger more workable.55 The Parts below discuss the many obstacles to
such a merger. Prior efforts to merge the two agencies revealed strongly
entrenched constituencies willing to battle to keep themselves separate,
and a vast gulf in the two agencies' regulatory approaches, creating
differing cultures that often clashed.

51.

TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 141.

52. Id. at 139, 142.
53. Jill Treanor,

Regulators back Taylor's twin-peaks theory, INDEPENDENT

(London),

Oct. 29, 1996, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/regulators-back-taylors-twinpeaks-theory1360780.html.
54. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 144.

55. Id. at 106-11.
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III. EFFECTS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS ON REGULATORY REFORM
A. The Needfor Reform Grows
The Treasury Blueprint encountered much opposition and only mild
support when it was published.5 6 Among those opposing the Blueprint
were the Consumer Federation of America and the Democratic leader of
the Senate Finance Committee, Christopher Dodd of Connecticut. 57 The
regulatory structure proposed by the Blueprint would also preempt most
state regulation of financial institutions, which the states would not
accept without a fight. After all, this would cut off the career paths of
many budding state politicians who witnessed the rise of Eliot Spitzer as
a result of his attacks on Wall Street.58 Even now Spitzer's successor as
New York's attorney general, Andrew Cuomo, is nationally known for
taking on Wall Street by investigating the financial services industry,
including student loans, auction rate securities, rating agencies, and even
bonuses paid to Merrill Lynch executives. 59
In November 2008, the NASAA announced its own plan for reform,
which recommended preserving state regulation, but admitted that some
streamlining might be in order. The NASAA advocated that all financial
products and markets be subjected to regulation so that there would be
no regulatory gaps. It was in favor of principles-based regulation, but
only as an additional layer to existing rules. The NASAA also
advocated tougher enforcement and stronger private remedies. 60 In
other words, it wanted to make the present situation of both state and
federal regulators-and their private
attorneys general (such as labor
61
unions)-even more intolerable.
56. The author attended a banking conference sponsored by the University of North Carolina law
school shortly after the Blueprint was published. The General Counsel for Wachovia noted that
Secretary Paulson had stated that the recommendations in the Blueprint were only "aspirational." The
General Counsel stated that he looked that word up in the dictionary and that it appeared to be a
derivative of the Latin term for "not a snowball's chance in hell." That was a fair assessment at the
time. Subsequent events, however, have overtaken Wachovia and other skeptics on the need to effect
regulatory reform.
57. David Cho et al., Long Fight Ahead for Treasury Blueprint, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2008, at
Al.
58. 1 have described those events in JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN
U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM passim (2005).

59. Amir Efrati & Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. News: Cuomo Blazes Own Trail as Wall Street Cop,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at A3; Michael J. de la Merced & Louise Story, Nearly 700 at Merrill in
Million-DollarClub, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at BI.
60. Press Release, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Assoc., NASAA to Host Financial
Services
Regulatory
Reform
Roundtable
(Nov.
26,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nasaa.org/NASAANewsroom/CurrentNASAAHeadlines/9910.cfm.
61. The Treasury Blueprint also sought an optional federal charter for insurance companies that
would preempt state law. Under the Treasury Blueprint, a federal Office of National Insurance would
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States were supported by the Congressional Oversight Panel, which
was created to oversee the $700 billion TARP bailout program that was
implemented to rescue financial institutions during the subprime crisis.
It recommended that states be given the power to regulate national bank
lending practices-a power the Supreme Court had previously held was
preempted by federal law. 62 The panel recommended that a single
federal regulator be created to set minimum standards for consumer
credit products, but permit the states to adopt more stringent
requirements.63
The intensity of the subprime crisis assured that regulatory reform
would be at the top of the new Obama Administration's to-do list. Even
before Obama was sworn in, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) issued a January 8, 2009, report which warned that significant
reforms were critically and urgently needed in the financial regulatory
system. Like the Treasury Blueprint, the GAO report recognized that
the financial structure was not the result of any grand design, but had
been created on an ad hoc basis over the years in response to financial
crises. The GAO concluded that the existing system was unable to
mitigate systemic risks, had difficulty controlling unregulated market
participants, failed to keep up with new and complex investments, and
suffered from a fragmented oversight regimen. 64 The GAO issued a
second report later that month calling for a major reform 65of the
regulatory system that it again called "fragmented and outdated."
President Obama appointed former Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volcker as chairman of a new Economic Recovery Advisory
Board, formed to advise the President on how to deal with the subprime
crisis. That appointment raised hopes that a Twin Peaks approach might
oversee these federally chartered insurance companies. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 128-33.
This proposal was given some impetus by the failure of the American International Group, which
received a $173 billion bailout by the federal government during the subprime crisis. Normally subdued
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke had some harsh words for AIG in testimony before Congress on March 3,
2009:
AIG exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system. There was no oversight of the
financial-products division. This was a hedge fund, basically, that was attached to a large
and stable insurance company, made huge numbers of irresponsible bets, took huge
losses. There was no regulatory oversight because there was a gap in the system.
Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Expresses FrustrationOver AIG Rescue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2009, at A2.
62. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
63. Regulatory Reform: Oversight Panel Calls for Regulatory Reform, With Risk Regulation,
More Powerfor States, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 155 (Feb. 2, 2009).
64. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY
SYSTEM (2009).
65. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE (2009).
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be adopted 66 because Volcker was also the chairman of the Group of
Thirty Financial Reform Working Group, which issued a report in
January 2009 advocating a two-tier regulatory structure. Under that
proposal, one tier would provide more stringent regulation for large
institutions and a second tier would have less regulation for smaller
institutions. 67 That recommendation would have reversed the existing
policy of deregulating larger institutions; that policy was based on what
some now believe was a mistaken theory that large institutions had the
sophistication to protect themselves and, therefore, did not need
regulatory protection.68
Under Volcker's Group of Thirty proposal, institutions posing
systemic risk would be restricted in their activities and prohibited from
taking on certain risks, such as owning a hedge fund. 69 This appeared to
be a return to the days of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933,70 which
prohibited commercial banks from investment bank activities, until its
repeal by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 (GLB Act).71 Critics of
the GLB Act have charged that it was responsible for the subprime
crisis. One of that legislation's sponsors, former Senator Phil Gramm,
pointed out that it was commercial banks' traditional role as mortgage
lenders that got them in trouble. 72 Citigroup, for example, had formed
an amalgamation of financial services even before the GLB Act, though
some of those services were prohibited by Glass-Steagall, i.e., insurance
underwriting.73
The ongoing subprime crisis dramatically illustrated the need for
reform. Functional regulation had been unsuccessful, as demonstrated
by impairment of the country's once-dominant financial services
position. Certainly all of the existing layers of functional regulation did

66. Volcker had served as chairman of a study by the Group of 30 on varying regulatory
approaches around the world. That study group issued a report in October 2008 that seemed to favor the
Twin Peaks approach. See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (2008).

SUPERVISION:

67. GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009).
68. See Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn

Lamb? 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995) (discussing this regulatory approach).
69. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 67, at 8.
70. No one knows why Congress adopted the Glass-Steagall Act, other than that it was a
panicked response to the ongoing economic crisis in the 1930s. That legislation only weakened banks,
but we may now be repeating that mistake. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its
History and Future,4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 236-37, 253-64 (2000).

71. See Paul J. Polking & Scott A Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1 (2000).
72. Phil Gramm, Deregulationand the FinancialPanic,WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A 17.
73. See CIT Group, Inc. v. Citicorp, 20 F. Supp. 2d 775 (D. N.J. 1998) (describing the breadth of
financial services offered by Citicorp before the passage of the GLB Act).
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nothing to inhibit the conduct or events that led to the subprime crisis.
The Treasury Blueprint was, perhaps, the first reasoned approach to
regulation since Alexander Hamilton's report to Congress in 1790.74
The existing regulatory structure has proved unable to effectively deal
with systemic events associated with market bubbles and panics.
Instead of a reasoned and rational approach to the effects of particular
actions on the economy as a whole, the regulators acted independently,
but predictably, to make a bad situation worse. The question at hand is
whether such a rational approach will be set aside by the hysteria
engendered by the subprime crisis, which has created a widespread
desire to punish the business community for the failures that led to that
crisis. Retribution may be satisfying but it will not correct a failed
regulatory system.
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE SEC AND CFTC
A. Summary
The Treasury Blueprint is a studied effort to restructure the existing
dysfunctional financial regulatory system into something more rational.
One part of that effort is its recommendation to combine the SEC and
CFTC. This recommendation seems, at least on the surface, to be an
improvement because both agencies largely regulate financial products,
and the two markets are rapidly converging. There are obstacles,
however.
Perhaps the most formidable barrier will be the inevitable
fight over allocation of jurisdiction for such a merged entity among
competing congressional committees.
Predictably, neither the
congressional banking committees, in the case of the SEC, nor the
agriculture committees, in the case of the CFTC, will be happy to give
up their jurisdiction. Equally daunting are the challenges in combining
the often-conflicting cultures of the agencies. The SEC and CFTC have
a history of clashing over their respective jurisdictions, and their
regulatory approaches are often sharply distinctive and incompatible.
The ongoing convergence of the securities and derivatives markets,
nonetheless, makes such a combination attractive.
However, the
Treasury Department Blueprint recognizes that such a merger will be
effective only if the new regulator can operate under a principles-based
regulatory system. Such a system is employed by the CFTC and is
better than the rules-based system of the SEC, which has proved to be a
74. See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 88-89 (2002).
75. See infra notes 300-75 and accompanying text.
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costly failure. The SEC must radically change its culture to implement
such a system. That will be no easy task.
B. Regulatory History

Regulation of financial services has a rocky history in the United
States. The Bank of the United States created by Alexander Hamilton

and chartered by Congress in 1791 was a joint private and governmental
effort to regulate money markets in the United States after the
Revolution.76 Congress voted, however, to let the Bank's charter expire

in 1816 after much opposition from private banks.77 Congress chartered
a second Bank of the United States in 1816, but it was destroyed in an
epic political battle between President Andrew Jackson and Senator
Henry Clay.7 8 That ended governmental efforts to play a role in the

private markets for decades.
Even the market depredations of the so-called robber barons after the
Civil War in the markets escaped regulation. Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and

Daniel Drew were among the worst of those offenders, and their
manipulation of railroad stocks and the gold market were legendary in
their audacity. 79 But they drew no congressional response. 80 The
seminal event that laid the groundwork for regulation of the securities
markets was the panic of 1907, during which J.P. Morgan acted as a

one-man central bank, marshalling the resources of the federal
government and private banks to stop an unexpected and violent panic

that threatened the entire financial system. 81 Ironically, Morgan's
heroics went unrewarded and he soon became the subject of a witch hunt
76. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 347-54 (2004). This model seems to have been
followed for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Chartering those privately owned entities to carry out
governmental policy proved to be a failure during the subprime crisis; both failed and were placed in
conservatorship by the government. They proved both to be a poor investment and even worse
mechanism for carrying out government housing policy by encouraging loans to poor (subprime)
borrowers. James R. Hagerty, Paulson:Redo Fannie,Freddie,WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009, at A11.
77. RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERICAN 215 (1999).
78. See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION, ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 208-10

(2008) (describing the political battle over the Bank of the United States).
79. See generally MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD (1986) (describing

Gould and his fellow operators).
80. Congress did regulate the railroads in 1887 through the Interstate Commerce Act of 1877, ch.
104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), that created the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Congress also enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7) in 1890 to meet rising concerns with the consolidation of several
industries; Standard Oil raised the most alarm. See generally RON CHERNOW, TITAN, THE LIFE OF JOHN
D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998) (describing those concerns).
81. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907, LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM (2007) (describing those events).
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82
to determine whether U.S. finance was controlled by a "money trust."
A congressional investigation led by Congressman Arsene Pujo of
Louisiana, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee
(Pujo Committee), resulted in a headline-making revelation that
interlocking boards of many major corporations gave the appearance of
control over a large portion of the U.S. economy to a few individuals,
such as J.P. Morgan, George F. Baker, an executive at the First National
Bank in New York, and James Stillman, President of the National City
Bank. 83 The Clayton Anti-Trust Act 84 was enacted and the Federal
Trade Commission created in 1914 to address those concerns.85 The
most significant result of the congressional investigations that followed
the 1907 panic was the creation of the Federal Reserve Board in 1913
despite strong
efforts by President Woodrow Wilson to defeat the
86
legislation.
The Pujo Committee also investigated the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in its hunt for a money trust, and concluded that the NYSE's
facilities were "employed largely for transactions producing moral and
economic waste and corruption." 87 The Pujo Committee concluded that
the NYSE was operating much like the futures exchanges, and that only
a small fraction of trading on the NYSE was for investment. Most
contracts were offset through "ring settlements" without taking delivery
of the securities, much like futures contracts. Turnover in some stocks
was extraordinary; for example, the Reading Railroad had its entire
stock issuance sold forty times over in 1907.88
Low margins on the NYSE (10%) encouraged speculation.89 The
Pujo Committee was scandalized by its discovery that officers and
directors of public companies were trading on inside information and
that manipulation of stock prices was common through wash sales by
"pools" of manipulators. 90 The Pujo Committee recommended that the
NYSE be required to incorporate under state law, so New York could
impose charter provisions requiring the exchange to restrict speculation

82. 1 have described those events in 2 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 31-53 (2002).

83. H.R. REP. No. 62-1593 (1913).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
85. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
86. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE

COUNTRY
87.
88.
89.
90.

276-82 (1987) (describing those events).
H.R. REP. No. 62-1593, at 116.
MARKHAM, supra note 82, at 51.
Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 62-1593, at 47.
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and abuses. 9 1 The Pujo Committee also concluded that there was a need
for federal regulation, and it sought a requirement that corporations
listed on the NYSE provide periodic accounting statements and a
description of payments made to brokers, promoters,
and others
92
associated with issuing or underwriting company stock.
Although no securities regulation resulted from the Pujo Committee
investigation, it set a precedent for congressional oversight of the
securities markets and educated Congress on the workings and abuses of
the securities markets. When the stock market crash occurred in 1929,
Congress pounced with hearings before its banking committees that
93
revealed, once again, widespread abuses in trading NYSE stocks.
Congress consequently adopted the federal securities laws, including the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC.94
The selection of Joseph Kennedy as first SEC chair was surprising
because he was a renowned stock market operator with a reputation for
devious trading practices. But President Roosevelt thought the best
approach was to "[s]et a thief to catch a thief., 95 Kennedy proved an
effective administrator, but the agency was small and did nothing to
restore confidence in the market. Capital was in hiding. The Roosevelt
Administration's regulatory threats and massive tax increases resulted in
a "serious strike of capital," 96 and it was not until the outbreak of World
War II in Europe that the U.S. economy began to recover. 97 The stock
market did not regain its 1929 high until 1954,98 at99which point the SEC
was considered a toothless, "moribund operation."
C. Insider TradingArrives
The SEC remained a small and somnolent agency until the 1960s,
when a new activist chairman, William Carey, a Columbia University

91.
92.
93.
94.

MARKHAM, supranote 82, at 52.
See H.R. REP. No. 62-1593, at 162-165.
See S. REP. No. 73-1455, (1934); H.R. REP. No. 37-85 (1933).
For a description of the background of the creation of the SEC and its development into a

powerhouse agency see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982).

95. JOHN H. DAVIS, THE KENNEDYS, DYNASTY AND DISASTER 78 (1993).
96. AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN, A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 337
(2007).

97. The SEC was declared a nonessential agency during the war and was shipped off to
Philadelphia to free up office space in Washington, D.C.
98. Chris Watling, Britain is Headedfor the Wilderness ifWe Borrow More Instead of Saving,

THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 11, 2009, at 82.
99. ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (1935-1975)
183-85 (1975).
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law professor, was appointed. 0 0 Carey strongly believed that large
corporations needed to be strictly regulated. '01 His most aggressive act
while chairman of the SEC was creating the crime of insider trading out
of whole cloth. 10 2 The SEC acquired a reputation for thoroughness
when it published its Special Study of the Securities Markets in 1963. 103
That study examined almost
every aspect of the securities industry and
04
1
flaws.
of
number
found a
The SEC gained new powers after the 1960s "paperwork crisis"
exposed widespread problems in the operations of the securities
industry. The industry nearly broke down during that crisis after several
large NYSE firms failed because of their inability to handle increased
trading volumes of 16 million shares per day. 10 5 The SEC used the
paperwork crisis to gain additional authority from Congress in 1975.116
That legislation allowed the SEC to regulate nearly all aspects of
securities market practices, ranging from settlement and clearing10 7 to

net capital 10 8 to protecting customer funds.' 0 9 The paperwork crisis
created a moral hazard in the form of SIPC insurance for the customers

100. See David Margolick, William Carey, Former SEC Chairman,Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1983, at B12:
"He was a pivotal figure who picked up the agency at a point where it had become a
dreary, unaggressive overseer of Wall Street, and transformed it into an institution that
worried about the really serious problems in the securities world," said Prof. Joel
Seligman of Northeastern Law School, author of a recent history of the commission. "He
was an absolute giant in the field."
Id.
101. Carey was particularly critical of the laxity of the Delaware corporate law in regulating
corporations. See, e.g., William Carey, A Proposed Federal CorporateMinimum Standards Act, 29
Bus. LAW. 1101 (1974); William Carey, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974).
102. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 S.E.C. Docket 907
(1961) and discussion infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
103. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. No. 88-95 (1963).
104. The SEC also conducted a study in 1971 on the growth of institutional trading, which was
supplanting the individual investor. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. No. 92-64 (1971).
105. See STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R. DOC.

No. 92-231 (1971) (describing those failures and problems). Today, trading volumes of over one billion
shares per day are common on both the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. On October 10,
2008, the NYSE handled volume of over 7 billion shares. See N.Y.S.E. Euronext, Firsts & Records,
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1022221392987.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
106. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 16 U.S.C.).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2006).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2009).
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of failed broker-dealers. 110 The SEC also used the 1975 legislation to
secure authority to implement a "central market" system (now called the
"national market system"), though it became a continuing bone of
contention over the years before culminating in Regulation NMS
(National Market System)."'
The 1970s witnessed another event that became legendary at the SEC:
"Mayday," the day the SEC prohibited broker-dealers from fixing
Several
commissions-an industry practice instituted in 1792.112
aggressive enforcement actions also raised the SEC's profile
considerably in the 1980s.113 The agency uncovered a vast system of
payments from public companies based in the United States to foreign
government officials to obtain business; this led to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.114 The SEC became stridently independent
during this process and was generally viewed to be a firm regulator; it
even earned the laudatory title of "Eagle on the Street" by two PulitzerPrize-winning reporters at the Washington Post after the Ivan Boesky
era scandals."15
D. SEC Regulatory Approach
The SEC is rules-oriented. It tries to dictate industry practice and
control the flow of information into the securities markets through
rules" 6 or enforcement actions that substitute for rulemaking. 1 7 The
110. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636.(codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111, 78o (2006)).
111. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005). For a discussion of the development
of the SEC's national market system see Junius W. Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, I
BROOK. J. CORP. FiN. & COM. L. 301 (2007).
112. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commissions:
The Origins of Modern Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y
311 (2008) (describing this history).
113. For example, the National Student Marketing case set off a furor when the SEC staff
launched an attack on its very prominent outside lawyers. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Student
Mktg Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). Robert Vesco's looting of the IOS mutual funds was
another noteworthy event during this period. See ARTHuR HERZOG, VESCO (1987) (describing Vesco's
escapades).
114. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
The disclosure of Lockheed's payments to foreign government officials toppled governments around the
world. See Daniel Patrick Ashe, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent
ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897
(2005) (describing the statute).
115. See DAvID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991).
116. One example of that effort is Regulation FD that seeks to make information flows to
financial analysts symmetric by prohibiting selective disclosures. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2009);. see
Yasuhiro Ohta and Kenton K. Yee, The Fairness Opinion Puzzle: Board Incentives, Information
Asymmetry, and Bidding Strategy, 37 J. Legal Stud. 229, 258 n.20 (2008) ("Even though the goal of
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SEC is also very protective of its jurisdiction and usually rejects
regulatory efforts that do not originate with it. A good example of this
rigidity was the SEC's refusal to accept international financial
accounting requirements (IFRS) that were principles-based and used by
most of the rest of world. Despite the IFRS's international popularity,
the SEC clung tenaciously to the homegrown rulebook based on
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).I1 8 The SEC required
foreign issuers to reconcile their IFRS accounting statements with
GAAP for filings with the agency.
After much criticism, the SEC dropped the requirement for foreign
issuers to reconcile their financial statements with GAAP 119 and began
to move toward embracing IFRS for U.S. issuers. 120 That seemed
appropriate because GAAPs were manipulated on such a massive scale
during the Enron-era scandals.' 21 But even the SEC's flexibility
regarding GAAPs seems to have gone by the wayside because of the
subprime crisis. The new SEC chair stated that those international
standards should be adopted cautiously, which22 may be a signal for
retaining the complex GAAP rule formulations. 1
E. Enron UnravelsAll
The SEC's reputation as a strong regulator unraveled during the
Enron and WorldCom scandals. These scandals raised questions about
the SEC's regulatory capabilities. Indeed, the entire accounting system
appeared broken, with numerous restatements and accounting
manipulations across a broad spectrum of firms. New York attorney
Regulation FD was to improve dissemination of public information, many academics argue that
Regulation FD has had a chilling affect on voluntary communication between firms and individual
analysts.").
117. See ROBERTA S,KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA (1982) (criticizing the creation of rules by prosecution).
118. See Maureen Peyton King, The SEC's (Changing?) Stance on IAS, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
315 (2001) (describing this controversy and SEC reconciliation requirements between GAAP and
international standards). See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting
Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (questioning SEC's
change in approach for the acceptance of international standards, calling it "the most revolutionary
securities law development since the New Deal").
119. Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8879, 92 SEC Docket 717 (Dec. 21,2007).
120. U.S. Regulators Face Fight on IFRS Accounting Cost, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE4AI12K20081119.
121. 1 have described those manipulations in MARKHAM, supranote 58.
122. Schapiro Vows to 'Reinvigorate'Enforcement at SEC ifConfirmed, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 77 (Jan. 19, 2009).
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general Eliot Spitzer also made the SEC look weak and out-of-touch by
exposing sordid practices by financial analysts who were privately
disparaging stocks that they were publicly touting. Those analysts were
at the heart of the SEC's full disclosure system, but the SEC failed in its
purported watchdog role. This led to a phenomenal $1.4 billion
analysts scandal, which
settlement with the firms in the financial
23
1
Citigroup.
and
Lynch
Merrill
included
The settlement imposed pervasive and punitive regulation on financial
analysts, and went so far as to require that an attorney be present to
chaperone any meetings between financial analysts and investment
bankers. That settlement resulted in less coverage of stocks by analysts,
not better analysis. That diminished coverage accelerated during the
subprime crisis. Between September 2008 and May 2009, financial
analysts dropped coverage on more than 2,200 securities, which was
about a quarter of all coverage of public companies in the United
States. 124
The SEC was sent reeling again after Spitzer exposed widespread
market timing and late trading abuses in mutual funds by several hedge
funds.125 SEC Chair Harvey L. Pitt was driven from office by Spitzer's
attacks on the SEC for lax regulation, and he was replaced by William
Donaldson. 126 To restore the SEC's sullied reputation, Donaldson
conducted a politicized campaign to jam through new regulations on
mutual funds-an effort the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected.1 27 The SEC then insolently and summarily readopted the rules
without even awaiting the mandate of that court. The D.C. Circuit
responded by once again striking the rules. 128 The D.C. Circuit also
rejected the SEC's effort to require hedge funds to register as investment
advisers. 29 Further humiliating the agency, the D.C. Circuit struck
down the SEC's rules exempting fee-based brokerage accounts from the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.130
123. 1have described those events in MARKHAM, supra note 58.
124. Jeff D. Opdyke & Annelena Lobb, MIA Analysts Give Companies Worries, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 2009, at Cl.
125. I have described that debacle in Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals-A Comparative
Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS
Bus. L.J. 67, 97-99 (2006).
126. Stephan Labaton, Easy Sailing For Nominee To the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at Cl.
127. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
128. Id. I have described this episode in Markham, supra note 125, at 97-99.
129. Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). I have described this
episode in Markham, supra note 125, at 104-05.
130. Fin, Planning Assoc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). I have
described this episode in MARKHAM & HAZEN, supranote 38, at § 3:8.50. That decision, unfortunately,
affected the accounts of some 1 million customers holding $300 billion in funds. See Temporary Rule
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F. The Subprime Crisis
The SEC seemed to be righting itself after the appointment of a new
chairman, Christopher Cox, a former California congressman and
securities lawyer. Though he initially appeared to have placed the
agency on level footing, the subprime crisis sent it reeling once again.
Cox's performance during the Bear Steams crisis was particularly
troubling. 131 For example, he assured the public that Bear Steams had
plenty of liquidity and was financially sound only three days before it
failed as a result of a liquidity crisis. 132 The SEC's own Inspector
General, thereafter, charged that the SEC had failed properly to
supervise Bear Steams.' 33 The Inspector General continued with a
string of embarrassing revelations, including a finding that one SEC
attorney had allowed his bar registration to lapse for a fourteen-year
period and that a SEC supervisory attorney had never been admitted to
any bar. 134 The SEC Inspector General also criticized the SEC's
program for monitoring insider trading by its own employees, finding
that two senior enforcement
attorneys were actively trading stocks
35
during office hours. 1
G. Madoff
Then there was the Madoff scandal. Bernard L. Madoff was a wellknown figure in the securities business. He had helped build, and was a
former chairman of, NASDAQ and had served on the board of
Regarding Principle Trades With Certain Advisory Clients, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022 (Sept. 28, 2007).
131. Kara Scannell & Susanne Craig, SEC Chief Under Fire as Fed Seeks Bigger Wall Street
Role-Cox Draws Criticismfor Low-Key LeadershipDuring Bear Crisis, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2008, at
Al.
132. Stephan Labaton, S.E.C. Image Suffers in a String of Setbacks, N.Y.Times, Dec. 16, 20008,
at B6.
133. Id. SEC rules required broker-dealers that were a part of a holding company structure to file
with the SEC disaggregated information on the firm's risk exposures. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17h-IT & 17h2T (2009). These rules were adopted in the wake of the Drexel Burnham Lambert failure that raised
concerns when capital was taken out of the broker-dealer subsidiary of that firm. The reports under
those rules were intended to be used by the SEC staffto assess the risks to broker-dealers from affiliated
entities. Amendments to Regulations for the Government Securities Act of 1986, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,792
(Nov. 15, 1994) (proposed rule). The SEC Inspector General found that the program was not being
properly updated or administered by the SEC during the subprime crisis. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES:
BROKER-DEALER
RISK
ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM
(2008),
available at
http://www.sec-

oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2008/446-b.pdf.
134. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (APRIL 1, 2008-SEPTEMBER 30, 2008) 11, 50-51 (2008), available at http://www.sec-

oig.gov/Reports/Semiannual/2008/seminov08.pdf.
135. Labaton, supra note 132.
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36
governors of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 1
He was also viewed as an industry innovator and a pioneer in electronic
trading in the 1970s when he turned the Cincinnati Stock Exchange into

an electronic market that traded NYSE-listed stocks.' 37 In December
2008, Madoff was arrested after he confessed that he had been running a
giant Ponzi scheme involving what he said were investor losses totaling
$50 billion. He was supposed to be managing funds for wealthy
investors, charities, universities, and fund-of-fund hedge funds, but
instead he committed the38largest investment fraud in history-and it
generated a media circus. 1
The SEC once again proved its ineptness. The agency was forced to
admit that it had ignored repeated warning signals that something was
amiss at the Madoff firm. Indeed, the SEC had received credible
136. Robert Frank et al., Fund Fraud Hits Big Names; Madoff's Clients Included Mets Owner,
GMAC Chairman, Country-ClubRecruits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at Al.
137. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Scheme Kept Rippling Outward, Crossing Borders, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at Al. The Cincinnati Stock Exchange was later moved to Chicago and renamed
as the National Stock Exchange. Tom Lauricella & Aaron Lucchetti, MadoffBrother, at Arm's Length?,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2009, at B I.
138. See Peter Lattman & Aaron Lucchetti, Losses in Madoff Case Spread; Alleged Ponzi
Scheme's Victims Include Lautenberg, Zuckerman, Spielberg's Charity,. WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2008, at
Al; Jenny Strasburg, 'Dr.Doom'Didn'tPredictMadoffBlowup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C 1.
Other losses of $3.5 billion were sustained at Kingate Management $3.5; Tremont Group
Holdings, a hedge fund owned by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. lost $3.3 billion; Banco
Santander lost $3.1 billion; HSBC Holdings, $1 billion; the Man Group, $360 million; the Royal Bank
of Scotland, $360 million; Nomura Holdings, $302 million. The government of Austria was forced to
take over Bank Medici, which lost more than $2 billion on a client funds through investments with
Madoff. Nelson D. Schwartz, European Banks Tally Losses Linked to Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2008, at B I. One unlucky investor, Martin Rosenman, gave Madoff $10 million only six days before he
was arrested. Worse yet, Madoff collected $250 million from his good friend Carl Shapiro just 10 days
before being arrested. Shapiro had already invested $150 million before that payment. Kenneth
Langone, of Richard Grasso fame, declined a request from Madoff to make an investment. Robert
Frank & Amir Efrati, Madoff Tried to Stave Off Firm's CrashBefore Arrest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2009,
at Cl.
Thierry Magon de la Villehuchet, the cofounder of the investment advisory firm Access
International Advisors that suffered $1.5 billion in losses from Madofi's fraud committed suicide on
December 23, 2008. He personally lost $50 million of his own money in the Madoff fraud, as well as
other family money. Alex Berenson & Matthew Saltmarsh, The Suicide of a Trader Contributes to
Mysteries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at B 1. The Madoff scandal exposed another aspect of hedge fund
investments, the money finders. These are individuals with family, social, or other connections with
wealthy investors. The money finders are paid a fee, usually a percentage of the money they refer to the
hedge fund, for this referral service. They are supposed to do their due diligence before making such
recommendations, but their relationship with the hedge fund manager is often either social or fee-based,
both of which discourage too much inquiry, which appears to be the case in the Madoff scandal. In
addition some of the fund-of-funds were supposed to be receiving fees for finding and vetting the very
best hedge fund managers, though they had done little due diligence. Some money managers claiming
expertise were simply placing money with Madoff and claiming success from his supposed returns. See
generally Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Mad Men, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2009, at Al I (discussing this
problem).
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allegations about the scheme at least nine years before Madoff's
confession. 139 SEC Chair Christopher Cox publicly expressed his
dismay over how the Madoff investigations were handled, and he asked
the SEC Inspector General to review the SEC's response to those
complaints and inquiries. Cox found the fact that the agency ignored the
warning signals "deeply troubling" because the SEC had "specific and
credible evidence"
of the Ponzi scheme long before Madoff s
40
confession. 1
The SEC's effectiveness was called into question on other grounds.
The SEC had previously claimed that it was necessary to require hedge
funds to register as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940141 in order to prevent fraud. 14 2 But the biggest fraud was
operating with impunity under the SEC's nose, by one of its own
registrants. Bernard Madoff had become a registered investment adviser
in 2006, apparently as a result of the SEC's aborted efforts to require
hedge funds to register. Unlike many hedge funds, however, Madoff did
not drop his registration after the D.C. Court of Appeals struck the hedge
fund registration requirement. Consequently, the SEC had all the
regulatory authority it claimed to need with respect to a hedge fund like

139. The SEC had investigated Madoff's accountant Frank Avellino eighteen years before the
discovery of the massive fraud. Avellino had been acting as a placement agent (money finder) for
Madoff and was charged by the SEC with promising investors guaranteed returns of 20% per year. The
SEC investigators thought that they had discovered a Ponzi scheme, but were reassured when Avellino
explained that the funds were invested with Madoff. The SEC required Avellino to return $440 million
of investor funds, but did not investigate to determine whether Madoff was actually running a Ponzi
scheme. The SEC was also alerted in 2006 that Madoff had misled it on the nature of his investments.
Alex Berenson, '92 Ponzi Case Missed Signals About Madoff,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at Al.
A 2001 article in Barron'smagazine also questioned how Madoff could legitimately produce
the large returns he was reporting. See Aaron Lucchetti & Tom Lauricella, Sons' Role in Spotlight,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2009, at B 1. In addition, Harry Markopolos, a rival investor, had been telling the
SEC for years that the Madoff fund had to be a Ponzi scheme because the returns being reported by
Madoff were completely unrealistic under the strategies he claimed to be using. Michael Lewis &
David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9. In
total, Madofr's broker-dealer was examined eight times in sixteen years by the SEC and NASD (now
FINRA), but they found no evidence of his Ponzi scheme and let him off the hook on a number of
technical violations that they did discover. Berenson, supra.
140. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Knew Him as Foe and Friend,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at B 1.
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l-80b-21 (2006).
142. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,056 (Dec. 10, 2004). For a description of those scandals see Markham, supra note 125, at
79-98. In seeking to regulate the hedge funds, the SEC failed to recognize that the mutual funds played
an equal role with the hedge funds in that scandal. Those mutual funds were subject to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l-80a-64 (2006), and were probably the most intensively
regulated financial institutions in the country, but all of that regulation served no purpose. So why
regulate the hedge funds? The SEC also faced a setback in the D.C. Circuit when it tried to impose a
super-majority independent director requirement on mutual funds in response to the late trading scandal.
See supra notes 125-28, and accompanying text.

2009]

MERGING THE FTC AND CFTC

563

Madoff's, but it failed to uncover his fraud despite substantive warnings
that something was amiss. Even after that failure, the SEC43 sought once
again to have hedge funds register as investment advisers. 1
Madoff's brokerage firm was dually registered as a broker-dealer and
as an investment adviser, yet the SEC failed to detect anything amiss. 144
SEC Chair Arthur Levitt even appointed Madoff to serve on an agency
advisory committee. 145
More embarrassment followed with the
discovery of several other Ponzi schemes. 146 In February 2009, another
143. Damian Paletta & Jenny Strasburg, Treasury Maps New Era of Regulation, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 2009, at Al.
144. Madoff was registered individually with the SEC as an investment adviser. He was also the
sole owner of a company called Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (BMIS) that was dually
registered with the SEC as a both a broker-dealer and an investment advisor. The SEC complaint
against Madoff thus charges:
BMIS is a broker-dealer and investment advisor registered in both capacities with the
Commission. BMIS engages in three different operations, which include investment
adviser services, market making services and proprietary trading. BMIS' website states
that it has been providing quality executions for broker-dealers, banks and financial
institutions since its inception in 1960;" and that BMIS,"[w]ith more than $700 million in
firm capital, Madoff currently ranks among the top 1% of US Securities firms." The most
recent Form ADV for BMIS filed in January 2008 with the Commission stated that BMIS
had over $17 billion in assets under management, and 23 clients. BMIS represented that
its trading strategy for adviser accounts involved trading in baskets of equity securities
and options thereon.
Complaint at 4, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Madoff, No. 08 CIV 10791 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 2008 WL
51970702008 WL 5197070.
The SEC complaint further charged that Madoff conducted "certain investment advisory
business for clients that is separate from the BMIS' proprietary trading and market making activities."
Id. at 5. Madoff conducted his "investment adviser business from a separate floor in the New York
offices of BMIS" and "kept the financial statements for the firm under lock and key, and was 'cryptic'
about the firm's investment advisory business when discussing the business with other employees of
BMIS." Id.
145. See Deborah Solomon, Money Manager, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,Jan. 25, 2009, at MMI1.
146. The Madoff scandal was followed a few weeks later with the discovery of a Ponzi scheme
being run by Joseph Forte in Broomall, Pennsylvania. He took in $50 million before confessing his
scheme to a postal inspector. Sarah N. Lynch, New Ponzi Case Pursued, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at
C5.
Just when you thought you had seen everything, Marcus Schrenker, an investment advisor in
Indiana accused of defrauding customers, jumped out of his airplane over Alabama. The crashed plane
was discovered in Florida, two hundred miles away. No one was fooled, and Schrenker was found
hiding in a campground near Quincy, Florida, where he slit one of his wrists just before being captured.
Schrenker survived that suicide attempt. JailedAdviser is Criticized by Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2009, at Al 1.In still another Ponzi scheme, Idaho authorities charged Daren Palmer and his hedge fund
Trigon Group, Inc. with defrauding investors of over $100 million. That fraud was carried out over a
period of over seven years. In Sarasota, Florida, Arthur Nadel, age 76, disappeared in January 2009, but
was arrested later that month. He had been running hedge funds with nearly $350 million in assets, and
which he reported were earning large returns between 2000 and 2006. John Kell, Crisis on Wall Street:
Fund Chief is charged With Fraud,WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, at C3. Authorities took Nicholas Cosmo
into custody on January 26, 2009 and charged him with operating a $380 million Ponzi scheme in
Hauppauge, New York. He was selling investors private bridge loans for a minimum $20,000
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massive fraud was revealed after the SEC
charged R. Allen Stanford
47
with defrauding investors of $8 billion. 1
H. The CFTC'sHistory
Though the commodity exchanges were largely untouched by federal
regulation until the 1920s, they were not without their problems.' 48 The
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was infamous, almost from its
introduction of futures trading before the Civil War, for "comers" and
149
other manipulative activities that adversely affected farm prices.
Although members of Congress introduced some 200 bills between 1880
50
and 1920 calling for regulation of the futures exchanges, none passed. 1
Nevertheless, regulation of the commodity futures markets preceded that
of the securities markets. Some limited commodity market legislation
was enacted before United States' entry into World War I, while stock
market regulation would not arrive until the 1930s. 5 '
Speculation associated with World War I led the FTC to conduct a
massive study of the grain trade. Composed of seven volumes, the study
isolated manipulative activities such as "comers" and "squeezes," which
investment and was promising returns of 48-80% percent per year. Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1.
These cases confirm that the SEC had no ability to prevent or detect fraud until even the most
fraudulent scheme was complete. Indeed, Ponzi schemes have been a perennial problem in the hedge
fund arena. They have included David Mobley's Maricopa Index Hedge Fund in Naples, Florida, which
defrauded investors of up to $350 million; the KL Group, which defrauded investors in Palm Beach of
an estimated $200 million; and Bayou Securities, LLC, which defrauded investors of $450 million.
Markham, supra note 125, at 120-21.
147. Harry Maurer & Cristina Linblad, A New Massive Fraud,Business Week, Mar. 2, 2009, at 5.
The Stanford scandal was followed by the arrest of hedge fund managers Paul Greenwood and Stephen
Walsh on charges of defrauding investors of $553 million. Victims included the University of
Pittsburgh, which lost $65 million, and the Carnegie Mellon University, which lost nearly $50 million.
Steve Stecklow et al., PairLived Large on Fraud,U.S. Says, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at Al.
148. Congress tried to prohibit gold futures trading during the Civil War, but gold prices then
soared and the statute was repealed two weeks after its passage. MARKHAM, supra note 74, at 271.
149. Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Unprosecutable
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 288-98 (1991).
150. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 10 (1986).

151. The Cotton Futures Act was passed in 1914 and established a system for grading cotton and
prohibiting all cotton futures contracts other than those specified in the statute. Ch. 255, 38 Stat. 693
(1914). That statute was declared unconstitutional because it was passed under Congress's taxing power
but did not originate in the House. Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). It was replaced by
the Cotton Futures Act, ch. 313, pt. A, 39 Stat. 446, 476 (1916). The Grain Standards Act, ch. 313, pt.
B, 39 Stat. 446, 482 (1916), authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to determine grade and inspection
procedures for grain. The Warehouse Act, ch. 313, pt. C, 39 Stat. 446, 486 (1916), authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture to license and inspect warehouse operators that stored agricultural products, but
this was a voluntary program.
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disrupted markets and pricing. 152 This study led to the Future Trading
Act, 153 but the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional because it
improperly relied on Congress's taxing power.154 This brief setback was
overcome when a market manipulation on the day after the Supreme
Court's decision led Congress to pass the act again, this time under its
Commerce Clause powers. 155 The second statute was renamed the
156
Grain Futures Act (GFA) and was upheld by the Supreme Court. 157
The GFA limited futures trading to "contract markets" licensed by the
federal government, thereby sanctioning an exchange monopoly and
establishing the exclusivity of those exchanges over trading in futures
contracts. 158 The theory was that limiting trading to "contract markets"
would promote the dissemination of price information, expand
regulation and monitoring of the marketplace, and eliminate bucket
shops; this would be most easily accomplished by granting "contract
market" status exclusively to exchanges that would police themselves to
protect their licenses.
The legislation also established what would later become the
Commodity Exchange Commission, composed of the Secretary of
Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General,
which was authorized to suspend or to revoke the registration of the
contract market if it failed to prevent manipulative activity by its
members. 159 Day-to-day administration of the statute was placed in the
in the
hands of the Grain Futures Administration, a small bureau located
160
ineffective.
be
to
proved
which
Agriculture,
of
Department
Like the stock markets, the grain exchanges were named as one of the
culprits leading to the Great Depression. In the case of the commodity
markets, depressed grain prices were blamed on speculators operating on
those exchanges. 161 After finishing with the stock markets, Congress,
then turned it focus to the futures markets and passed the Commodity

152. See 1-7 FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE GRAIN

TRADE (1921).
153. Ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
154. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 67-1095, 2 (1922).
156. Ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
157. Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
158. The GFA authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to designate a "board of trade" as a
"contract market." Once registered, the contract market was required to police its members' conduct to
prevent manipulation and dissemination of false reports that could affect commodity prices. § 4, 42
Stat. 998 at 1000.
159. Id.§6.
160. Markham, supra note 149, at 302-06.
161. MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 23-26.
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Exchange Act (CEA).162 Though the CEA prohibited commodity price
"manipulation," its failure to define the term would cause uncertainty
and result in time-consuming and expensive litigation that the
government often lost. 163
The CEA had a number of other flaws. For example, the CEA was
limited to the trading of options and futures contracts on certain
enumerated commodities.1 64 As futures trading expanded to other
commodities, the CEA was amended to bring those futures contracts
within its reach.
The amendments always lagged behind the
development of new contracts, which allowed the speculators trading the
unregulated contracts to avoid regulation for a time.
The CEA renewed the Commodity Exchange Commission. The
Department of Agriculture again carried out the day-to-day
administration of the CEA, this time through a renamed bureau call the

Commodity Exchange Authority. The Commodity Exchange Authority
was a little-known agency in the Department of Agriculture until an
explosion in commodity prices in the 1970s. 165 That inflation was
blamed on futures speculators, which aroused the ire of consumers and
Congress-a situation strongly reminiscent of the commodity price runup in 2008.166 Scandals in the trading of commodity options, and
concerns over price manipulations involving sales of grain to the Soviet
Union, added to the concern and made legislation inevitable.
The commodity markets fought off legislation in 1968 that would
have given the Commodity Exchange Authority teeth.
Minor
amendments were made in 1968, but none measurably strengthened the
Commodity Exchange Authority. But the turmoil in the market in the
1970s gave Congress sufficient leverage to pass broad and intrusive
regulation over the commodity exchanges. 167 That legislation, the
162. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
163. See generally Markham, supra note 149. The CEA sought to curb speculation by creating
position limits that restricted the amount of futures contracts that could be held by any one speculator.
The statute continued to regulate the contract markets by requiring their registration and imposing duties
on those exchanges to prevent manipulation. "Futures commission merchants," which are brokerage
firms that accept orders and funds from customers on the contract markets, were also required to
register. § 10, 49 Stat. at 1500
164. See §§ 4-4i, 49 Stat. at.1492-97.
165. The "Great Salad Oil Swindle" occurred on the Commodity Exchange Authority's watch in
1962. That scandal involved Anthony DeAngelis, the "salad oil king," who was issuing fraudulent
warehouse receipts on soybean oil held in warehouse tanks that did not exist. He was also speculating
heavily in soybean futures contracts. Discovery of that fraud set off a market panic. See NORMAN C.
MILLER, THE GREAT SALAD OIL SWINDLE (1965).
166. MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 56-65.
167. Id. at 52-56. Among other problems, a scandal, called the "great grain robbery," arose over
the large profits being made by grain companies from sales of grain to the Soviet Union. "The 'grain
robbery' of 1972 was one of those economic events that, like the OPEC oil embargo.., can truly be
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTC Act),
created a new federal regulatory agency, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), which was to be the futures industry
analogue to the SEC. 168 The CFTC Act expanded the scope of the CEA
to include all commodities without enumeration, which swept up even
futures contracts on financial instruments. The CFTC was given broad
powers, including injunctive authority to stop violations and to impose
civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation. Additional categories of
new registrants were added, including commodity pool operators and
commodity trading advisors. 169
1.CFTC Challenges
The CFTC faced challenges from the moment it was created. It was a

small agency that did not have the resources to police the commodity
markets effectively. This became clear in connection with over-thecounter commodity options firms. 170 The legislation creating the CFTC
preempted the SEC's authority to regulate those firms. The SEC

exercised that authority to stop mass fraud of such instruments in the
early 1970s. 171 Preemption by the CFTC, however, led to another round

of fraud by renegade commodity option firms, which the CFTC was
powerless to stop. In desperation, the CFTC imposed a temporary ban
said to have changed the world." DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 120-21 (4th ed. 1979).
168. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. Apparently the White House asked SEC Chairman Ray
Garrett whether the SEC would like to take control of the futures markets before this legislation was
introduced. He declined, so the CFTC was created instead. John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars:
Support For a CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1991).
169. § 202, 88 Stat. at 1395-96.
170. See Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options-Two Regulatory
Approaches and Their Conflicts, 47 ALB. L. REV. 741, 762-68 (1983) (describing the CFTC's problems
regulating commodity options).
171. The SEC viewed the Commodity Exchange Authority as a toothless tiger after that agency
failed to do anything to stop widespread fraud in commodity options in the 1970s. The Commodity
Exchange Authority stood aside as the SEC took a very expansive view of its own jurisdiction over such
options. The SEC sued those firms claiming that the options they were selling to the public were
securities, thereby pulling those instruments under SEC jurisdiction. The courts never definitively
determined whether the SEC actually had the power to regulate those firms, but the SEC and state
securities regulators continued to claim such authority. Id.
That jurisdictional claim over commodity options allowed the SEC to pull the Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc. (CBOE) within its regulatory ambit when that exchange was created in 1973.
The CBOE was created by the CBOT to apply futures trading principles to securities. To get the
exchange off the ground, however, the CBOT was forced to submit to SEC jurisdiction. According to a
subsequent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, if the CBOT had waited only
one more year, the CBOE would have been regulated by the CFTC under the CFTC Act of 1974.
Because the CBOE was already registered with the SEC as a national securities exchange, it was not
within the reach of that statute. Bd.of Trade v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 677 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th
Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
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on all commodity options. This led to much criticism of the CFTC and
it further weakened the agency. The CFTC tried to limit commodity
options trading, for the most part, to the regulated commodities
exchanges, 172 but continued to be plagued by numerous fraudulent flyby-night operations selling off-exchange options and other instruments,

particularly in foreign currency. The CFTC's efforts to thwart that fraud
were limited by its jurisdiction over foreign currency-which Congress
reserved for the bank regulators when it passed the CFTC Act.' 73 In
2000, the CFTC obtained corrective legislation, but a Seventh Circuit
decision undercut those amendments, 174 and further legislation
75 was
necessary in 2008-not exactly a good track record on this issue. 1
The CFTC faced other crises. First, in 1976, a giant manipulation and
default of futures contracts on the potato market took place.' 76 Then the
oil-rich Hunt family of Dallas, Texas, made headlines when members
collectively purchased a massive amount of soybean contracts on the
CBOT. 177 Finally, the Hunt family again played a prominent role in the
"silver crisis" in 1980, which threatened the viability of a large brokerdealer. 178 This was the first clear warning that the commodity futures
markets and the securities markets were becoming intertwined
and that a
79
1
other.
the
into
reverberate
could
market
one
in
failure
172. See supranote 171 and accompanying text.
173. See Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465,472 (1997) (describing that limitation).
174. In that decision, the Court held that "spot" foreign currency transactions traded over-thecounter were not subject to CFTC regulation. The Seventh Circuit so ruled despite clarifying efforts of
Congress under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which sought to assure that the
CFTC had broad jurisdiction over foreign currency trading that involved retail customers. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Zelner, 373 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2004); accord Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2008).
175. The new amendments were included in the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, which was
enacted as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat.
923. Under the 2008 legislation, the CFTC was given regulatory authority over all-exchange retail
transactions in foreign currency that were offered on a leveraged or margin basis, or financed by the
offeror or its affiliates. The legislation created a new category of registrants, "retail foreign exchange
dealers." Such registrants are required to have minimum adjusted net capital of $20 million. This net
capital requirement was applied to futures commission merchant's acting as foreign-currency
counterparties. The CFTC was also given broader regulatory authority over the foreign currency market
and its participants, including commodity pool operators and commodity trading advisors.
176. That affair is described in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353,369-71 (1982).
177. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1979).
178. See HARRY HURT Ill, TEXAS RICH: THE HUNT DYNASTY FROM THE EARLY OIL DAYS
THROUGH THE SILVER CRASH 395-420 (1981) (describing the silver crisis).
179. The Hunts failed to meet margin calls on their silver futures contracts in March 1980 as
several prices plunged. That failure nearly bankrupted one of their brokers, Bache & Co., which was a
futures commission merchant, but was also one of the country's largest broker-dealers. Merrill Lynch
was also facing massive losses as a result of the Hunts' failure to meet margin calls on their silver
futures positions held at Merrill, which was also a registered futures commission merchant. The Hunts'
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J. FinancialFutures
Soon after the CFTC was created, the CBOT introduced a futures
contract on Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or
Ginnie Mae) pass-through certificates that the CFTC approved without
consulting the SEC. Those certificates involved pooling a bundle of
mortgages into a trust or other special-purpose entity. Certificates of
ownership were then sold in that pool. The certificate holders were paid
monthly mortgage payments in aliquot portions from the pool. The
value of these certificates fluctuated as interest rates changed. Although
it was not required to register with the SEC under the Securities Act of
1933, the GNMA pass-through certificate was considered a securities
industry product and was therefore regulated by the SEC. The SEC also
viewed GNMA futures to be the equivalent of "when issued"
GNMAs. 8 0
Futures contracts on the GNMA securities were immediately
successful and that success was followed by innovative futures contracts
on stock indexes, such as the S&P 500, and later the Dow Jones indexes.
The approval of those futures contracts, which the SEC continued to
view as securities industry products, set off a long-running war between
the SEC and CFTC over which agency should have jurisdiction over
such instruments. That fight, however, did nothing to slow the CFTC's
approval of more futures-style trading on financial instruments,
including government securities. 181
The SEC retaliated by asking Congress to remove jurisdiction from
the CFTC over futures and options on securities products. In 1978,
during the CFTC's congressional reauthorization hearings, the SEC
sought jurisdiction over futures contracts where the underlying
"commodity" was a security. The GAO supported the SEC's request. 182
The Treasury Department also sought a jurisdictional change to give it a
regulatory role over futures contracts where the underlying commodity
was a government security. Congress rejected both those requests but
did require the CFTC to "maintain communications" with the SEC, the
defaults were so serious that they were viewed as a systemic risk. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Paul Volcker was called out in the middle of the night in his pajamas to bless a $1.1 billion loan to bail
out Bache, Merrill Lynch, and other brokerage firms. See Peter W. Bernstein, Engelhard's Not-SoSterling Deal with the Hunts, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, May 19, 1980, at 84. The SEC conducted a massive
study of that event to measure the danger presented by futures business to the broker-dealers it
regulated, but not much was done to prevent future problems. U.S. SEC. & Excti. COMM'N, THE SILVER
CRISIS OF 1980: A REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1983).
180. See MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 81-83 (describing this event).
181. See Lily Tijoe, Credit Derivatives:Regulatory Challenges in an Exploding Industry, 26 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 387 (2007) (describing these ongoing jurisdictional fights).
182. The GAO was later renamed as the Government Accountability Office.
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Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve Board. Congress further
instructed the CFTC to consider the views of the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve Board. The SEC, pointedly, was not on that last
list. Clearly, the futures markets had powerful friends on the agriculture
committees (which considered the legislation) who
were not about to
83
cede that jurisdiction to the banking committees. 1
The SEC did not take defeat gracefully. It retaliated by approving the
trading of GNMA options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.
(CBOE), which the SEC regulated, so that the securities industry could
compete with the GNMA futures. That action was taken over the
objections of the CBOT. But the SEC failed to consider that the futures
business was a major industry in Chicago and that the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals would protect it. Judges on that court included some
antiregulatory adherents from the University of Chicago Law School's
theory of law and economics, a school of thought disenchanted with the
SEC. The Seventh Circuit held that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction
84
over such instruments, so they could not be traded on the CBOE. 1
That litigation brought the SEC to the negotiating table. In 1982, the
CFTC and SEC settled some jurisdictional differences through the socalled Shad-Johnson Accords-an agreement between the chairmen of
the two agencies-that was subsequently enacted. 185 That agreement
confirmed the CFTC's authority to approve futures and options on
futures contracts on broad-based indexes, and allowed index options to
be traded on the CBOE and other option exchanges regulated by the
SEC. 186 Jurisdiction over options trading on currency was split between
183. MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 99-100.
184. Bd. of Trade v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot,
459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
185. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294.
186. The legislation that enacted the Shad-Johnson Accords into law also divided jurisdiction
between the SEC and CFTC over commodity pools, which is the futures industry analogue to the mutual
fund, but became more widely used as a device for hedge fund asset management. The SEC was
authorized by the 1982 amendments to treat the sale of interests in such pools as securities but could not
regulate their operations. Rather, the CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction over the operations of
commodity pools. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294. At the time,
commodity pools were a very obscure investment vehicle for managed futures trading, but the rise of the
hedge funds and their desire to trade highly leveraged instruments such as those regulated by the CFTC
made the commodity pool an important investment medium in future years.
The 1982 amendments also required a joint study by the SEC, CFTC, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the Department of the Treasury on the economic effects of options and futures trading,
including any effects on capital raising. The study, when completed, concluded that financial futures
and options did not have any measurable adverse affects on the formation of capital and even enhanced
liquidity in some markets. The study also determined that the options contracts regulated by the SEC
and those regulated by the CFTC differed in some respects; they also had common elements and both
served similar economic functions. The two markets were found to be closely interrelated and close
coordination of regulation was urged. The study concluded that the separate regulation by the SEC and
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the SEC and CFTC. The agreement also gave the SEC, in effect, veto
power over new stock index futures contracts approved by the CFTC. If
the SEC exercised that power, the CFTC could challenge it in court. A
dispute soon broke out between the SEC and CFTC over that veto
power, which
required another interagency agreement (Joint Policy
187
Statement).
K. The Stock Market Crash of 1987
Futures contracts traded on securities resulted in a great deal of
trading by institutions that had previously shunned the commodity
markets. A number of new trading strategies were also developed.
Those strategies included "dynamic hedging" and "portfolio insurance,"
which allowed portfolio managers to protect their portfolios from, or
expose them to, market changes without liquidating the assets held in the
portfolio. "Program trading" was another new popular addition to the
market, involving trading on the basis of signals generated by computer
programs that predicted market changes through mathematical models,
which analyzed massive computerized databanks for trends that
appeared to repeat over time. 188
This raised the "Cascade Theory," a concern that coupling financial
futures with computerized trading programs might pose a danger to the
markets. 189 While each computerized trading program had individual
variations and nuances, they generally shared a common feature: in the
event of a market decline the computer programs would all generate sell
signals. That selling would push the market down further, which would
generate more sell signals, which would push prices down even further,
and generate more sell signals. Critics were concerned that the
computers would create a descending spiral-a cascade-that would
continue until the market collapsed. 190
That prophesy was nearly fulfilled in the Stock Market Crash of 1987,
when the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped more in absolute and
relative terms than the sell off in the Stock Market Crash of 1929. The
1987 crash paralyzed the NYSE because it simply did not have the
CFTC of functionally similar contracts had not caused any harm, although there had been some
aberrations in arbitrage trading between the two respective markets. See MARKHAM, supra note 150, at
111-12.
187. Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in the Futures Markets: JurisdictionalCompetition
Between the SEC, the CFTC,and OtherAgencies, 4 J. FuTuRES MKTS. 367, 375 (1984).
188. Jerry W. Markham & Rita MeCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United
States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 1999-2001 (1988).
189. Id. at 2014.
190. Id. at 2001.
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capacity to handle the unexpected volume and price volatility.
NASDAQ market makers also fled, leaving their customers stuck in the
market as prices crashed. The commodity exchanges continued to
function throughout the crisis. 191
A number of studies were conducted after the Stock Market Crash of
1987 to determine whether the commodity futures markets should be
further regulated. The SEC advocated adopting crippling margin
requirements that would curb speculation in the futures markets.
President Ronald Reagan created a presidential task force to consider
that and other issues raised by the 1987 crash; the Task Force on Market
Mechanisms (Brady Commission) was headed by Nicholas Brady, who
later became Secretary of the Treasury. The Brady Commission
concluded that the uncertain division of regulatory jurisdiction between
the SEC and the CFTC over futures products on securities was a culprit
inthe crash.192 Some critics sought a merger of the two agencies, and
the SEC tried to claim the role of super regulator, 193 but the Brady
Commission did not believe a merger would create an effective intermarket regulator. Instead, the Brady Commission recommended that the
Federal Reserve Board be tasked with promulgating regulations that
would cut across the securities and
commodity markets.' 94 That
95
1
followed.
not
was
recommendation
Following the Stock Market Crash of 1987, President Ronald Reagan
created an interagency task force responsible for coordination regulation
between the stock and futures markets.
This group, called the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG), was

191.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON

THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH 63 (1988).
192. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988) [hereinafter
MARKET MECHANISMS].

193. Two of the five SEC commissioners dissented from the SEC's effort to make itself the super
regulator. Markham & Stephanz, supranote 188, at 2027 n.223.
194. MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 192, at 61-63.
195. There have been other calls for consolidated regulation.

See Richard Carlucci, Note,

Harmonizing U.S. Securities and Futures Regulations, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 461 (2008);
Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum--Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single
FinancialServices Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2005); Kai Kramer, Aren't We Still in the
"Garden of Forking Paths"?A Comment on Consolidation ofthe SEC and CFTC, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX
L. J. 410 (2004); Mark Frederick Hoffman, Decreasingthe Costs of JurisdictionalGridlock: Mergerof
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 28 U.
MICH. I.L. REFORM 681 (1995); Benson, supra note 168; Alan Schick, A Review and Analysis of the
Changing FinancialEnvironment and the Needfor Regulatory Realignment, 44 BUS. LAW. 43 (1988).
In 1990, Representatives Dan Glickman and Dennis Eckart, introduced a bill that would have merged
the CFTC and SEC into a new Markets and Trading Commission. H.R. 4477, 101st Cong. (1990). A
similar bill was introduced in 1995 by Representatives Wyden and Leach. H.R. 718, 104th Cong., I'
Sess. (1995).
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composed of the heads of the Department of the Treasury, Federal
Reserve Board, SEC and CFTC. 196 The Secretary of the Treasury led
the group. 197 Future jurisdictional battles between the SEC and the
CFTC would be fought through the PWG. After its formation, the PWG
took up regulatory issues concerning over-the-counter derivatives, hedge
funds, private equity,
and various policy initiatives involving the
98
markets.'
financial
The Stock Market Crash of 1987 renewed conflict between the SEC
and the CFTC. The SEC wanted the federal government, instead of the
exchanges, to regulate stock index futures margins in order to raise their
margins and to curb speculation. 199 As the Treasury Blueprint noted,
however, margin plays distinct roles in the securities and futures
industries. In the securities industry, margin is used as a credit control
device to limit the funds that can be used for speculation or investment.
In contrast, margin in the futures industry is used only to protect credit,
i.e., it is used as a down payment to assure performance on the
contract.200
Congress compromised by delegating the authority to set margin on
stock-index contracts to the Federal Reserve Board, which delegated its
authority to the CFTC, which delegated its authority to the exchangesso nothing changed and the SEC and the CFTC continued to fight over
margins. 20 1 For example, the Treasury Blueprint noted that the SEC and
the CFTC agreed in principle on how to margin portfolios with
diversified risks, but could not agree on the specifics of reaching that
goal.20 2 The issue of increasing margins to limit speculation was again
raised during the subprime crisis when commodity prices spiked. But
that spike was just that-a spike-and the concern over margin levels as
a way to curb speculation eased when commodity prices declined.20 3

196. Nathaniel C. Nash, White House Group Recommends Only Limited Changes in Markets,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at Al.
197. U.S.
Dep't
of
Treasury,
Office
of
Financial
Market
Policy,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-markets/fin-market-policy/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
198. See id.
199. For a description of this debate see Jerry W. Markham, FederalRegulation of Margin in the
Commodity FuturesIndustry--History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 119-23 (1991).
200. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 116.
201. Jerry W. Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule--Should a More Risk-Based Approach be
Adopted?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1093 n.12 (1996).
202. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 116.
203. Gregory Meyer, Margins Loom Large in Oil-TradingProbe, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2008, at
C13. There have been numerous efforts to use margin requirements to curb speculation and futures
contracts over the years through increased margin requirements. The commodity exchanges have beaten
back all of those efforts. One dramatic example involved the widespread speculation that occurred after
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The conflict between the SEC and the CFTC continued after the
Stock Market Crash of 1987. A fight broke out between the two
agencies in 1989 over securities exchanges' use of "index
participations." These instruments were cash-settled contracts on an
index of securities that operated like futures contracts, but were traded
on the securities exchanges. The Seventh Circuit intervened once again
and held that the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over those
instruments, which meant that they could not be traded on the securities
exchanges. The Seventh Circuit further held that if an instrument had
elements of both securities and futures, then the CFTC would have
exclusive jurisdiction. 204

That decision was a slap in the SEC's face, but it continued to battle
with the CFTC. In an incredible act of chutzpah, the SEC allowed the
securities exchanges to trade option contracts on some popular subindexes generated by Dow Jones. At the same time, the SEC exercised
its veto authority and prohibited trading futures contracts on the same
indexes. That discriminatory action resulted in another challenge in the
Seventh Circuit, and the SEC lost again. The Seventh Circuit noted that
the SEC's order implementing its veto disagreed with how the CFTC
regulated the futures markets, stating, among other things, that margins
were too low in the industry. The Seventh Circuit not too gently
suggested that20 such
concerns were not the SEC's business, but a matter
5
Congress.
for
V. OTC DERIVATIVES
A. New Products
Financial engineering became a phenomenon in the last three decades
of the twentieth century. In addition to financial futures, a wave of new
World War II in the commodity futures markets. President Truman then launched an assault in the press
on the commodity exchanges that were refusing to boost their margins to levels the administration
thought would stop that speculation. Markham, supra note 199, at 77-78. Those charges came back to
haunt Truman. A select committee of Congress found that confidential government information had
been used to profit from trading futures contracts on a number of agricultural commodities. Some 900
federal government employees were speculating in the commodity markets and made over $10 million
in profits. One clerk in the Navy Department was trading millions of bushels of wheat, oats, corn, lard,
cotton and eggs. The scandal turned ugly when it was discovered that Ed Pauley, President Truman's
personal physician, and General Wallace Graham, one of Truman's cronies, were among the commodity
speculators. Graham admitted to profits of $1 million. Those and other scandals tainted the Truman
administration as corrupt. In the end, there was no proof that the speculators caused the price rises, but
it made great theater. MARKHAM, supra note 82, at 272-73.
204. Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
205. See Bd. of Trade v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1999).

2009]

MERGING THE FTC AND CFTC

instruments appeared after the CFTC was created that contained
elements of futures or options. The CFTC was faced with decisions on
whether and how to regulate such instruments. If CFTC had jurisdiction
over those instruments, the exchange-trading requirement would have
precluded their use because over-the-counter dealers could not act as
self-regulators or incur the expense of such regulation. In addition,
institutional traders neither wanted nor needed the CEA's regulatory
protection. 206
A fight over futures-type trading in the Brent oil market resulted in a
district court decision that such transactions were futures contracts
subject to the CEA, even though the institutions trading in the market
needed no such protection.2 °7 That decision threatened to shut down
that market, at least in the United States, until Congress acted to allow
the CFTC to exempt that market from contact market registration
requirements. 20 8 Another new contract, the swap, was immediately
popular in the financial markets. It too was not tradable on the
exchanges and would have perished if an exchange-trading requirement
had been imposed.20 9 Other instruments with hybrid features included
bonds that had a fixed interest rate of return with a commodity price
kicker that would provide an additional return if a commodity, such as
silver or oil, increased by a specified amount; the bond holder paid for
the commodity price kicker by receiving a lower interest rate than would
be paid on a comparable instrument without such a feature.210
The CFTC tried to regulate these and other instruments by
ascertaining whether their options or futures elements outweighed their
other features; this created much confusion and complexity. 211 In 1989,
the CFTC issued a policy statement that exempted swap transactions
from its regulatory reach,2 12 but there was uncertainty over whether the
CFTC had the power to do so. To provide more certainty, the Futures

Trading Practices Act of 1992 authorized the CFTC to exempt swaps,
which it did. 213 The CFTC also exempted various over-the-counter
206. For a description of these instruments and the CFTC's efforts to regulate them, see Jerry W.
Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange Act: A Call for

Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (1990) and Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds,"
"General Custer," and the Regulation of Derivative FinancialInstruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1

(1994).
207. Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd v. BP N. Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
208. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590.
209. See Mark D. Young & William L. Stein, Swap TransactionsUnder the Commodity Exchange
Act: Is CongressionalAction Needed? 76 GEO. L. J. 1917 (1988).
210. See Markham, supra note 206.
211. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,684 (July 21, 1989).
212. Policy Statement Concern Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 21, 1989).
213. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 § 502, 106 Stat. at 3629.
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energy contracts in the wake
of the Brent oil market decision as well as
2 14
instruments.
hybrid
other
Use of derivatives dealer firms that arranged transactions and
guaranteed their performance grew the swaps market rapidly. In the
1990s, the growth of OTC derivatives trading by many large financial
institutions regulated by the SEC aroused the agency's interest and led
to another jurisdictional battle with the CFTC, which the SEC lost. The
SEC then decided to enter derivatives regulation through the back door
by creating a broker-dealer "Lite" registration program for brokerdealers that were also derivatives dealers in the over-the-counter
market.2 15 The SEC required these OTC derivative dealers to establish
risk management programs to monitor and manage the risks of their
positions. The SEC allowed the OTC derivative dealers to use value at
risk systems (VaRs), consistent with the Basel II Accord for banks,
which allowed the banks to compute their capital based on the risks in
their portfolios. 2 16 The SEC rules for broker-dealer Lites imposed a
capital requirement to prevent "excessive leverage" and cushion steep
market declines:
The final rule contains the minimum requirements of $100 million in
tentative net capital and $20 million in net capital. The minimum
tentative net capital and net capital requirements are necessary to ensure
against excessive leverage and risks other than credit or market risk, all of
which are now factored into the current haircuts. Further, while the
mathematical assumptions underlying VaR may be useful in projecting
possible daily trading losses under "normal" market conditions, VaR may
not help firms measure losses that fall outside of normal conditions, such
as during steep market declines. Accordingly, the minimum capital
requirements provide additional safeguards to account for possible
extraordinary losses or decreases in liquidity
during times of stress which
Z1 7
are not incorporated into VaR calculations.
Broker-dealer Lite registration was not popular until 2004, when the
SEC adopted a Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) program that
allowed large investment banks to change how they 218
computed their
capital to meet SEC requirements for capital minimums.
That change
214. Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,286 (Apr. 20,
1993).
215. OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,362 (Nov. 3, 1998)
216. Id. at 59,384.
217. Id. (footnote omitted).
218. The Securities Exchange Act authorized the SEC to impose capital requirements on brokerdealers (former 15 U.S.C. § 78h(b)). The SEC, however, essentially deferred to the exchanges on that
regulation until the paperwork crisis at the end of the 1960s. The SEC then adopted a Uniform Net
Capital Rule. 17 CF.R. § 15c3-1. It was a liquidity measure that was designed to ensure that program-
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allowed large, highly capitalized broker-dealers to use mathematical
models to calculate net capital requirements for market and derivativesrelated credit risks.
The SEC's change was in response to a 2002 European Union (EU)
directive that required foreign financial services firms with operations in
the EU to demonstrate holding company supervision equivalent to EU
consolidated supervision. This requirement-known as the Basel II
approach-applied to many large broker-dealer operations in the United
States. 219 In adopting the Basel II approach, the SEC leveled the
playing field for capital requirements among the large competing
broker-dealers and banks.22°
To operate under the new rule, the large broker-dealer investment
banks had to consolidate supervision of their ultimate holding company
and affiliates. Consequently, such firms were called CSEs. 22 1 A
"broker-dealer may use this 'alternative/CSE' method only if its ultimate
holding company agrees to compute group-wide allowable capital and
allowances for market, credit, and operational risk in accordance with
the standards adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision"
in the Basel II accord. The CSE also had to consent to group-wide SEC
supervision, which rarely happened because the SEC did not have the
resources to carry out that task.222

The SEC required CSEs to follow the broker-dealer Lite risk
management procedures, which meant they would use VaR models to
determine their capital requirement.223 Such risk management systems
could calculate the market risk and derivatives-related credit risk
components of the CSE's net capital requirement, and replace the
traditional SEC "haircut" approach to calculating net capital. 224 This
program was designed to be a "risk capital" approach to net capital,
which was a significant variation from the liquidity test otherwise
dealers would have sufficient funds on hand to meet customer demands. For a discussion of that
complex rule see MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 38, at ch. 4.
219. Alternative Market Risk and Credit Risk Capital Charges for Futures Commission Merchants
and Specified Foreign Currency Forward and Inventory Capital Charges, 70 Fed. Reg. 58,985 (Oct. 11,
2005); see Jorge E. Vifiuales, The InternationalRegulation of FinancialConglomerates: A Case-Study
of Equivalence as an Approach to FinancialIntegration, 37 CAL W. INT'L L. J. 1 (2006) (describing the
European Union's Financial Conglomerates Directive and the SEC's response for consolidated
supervised entities).
220. For a description of Basel I1,see BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 22, at 523-28.
221. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54255 (July 31, 2006).
222. Id.
223. The mathematical models that could be used by a CSE for risk assessment included VaR
models and scenario analysis that were already a part of these entities' internal risk management control
systems. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17i-4 (2009) (incorporating 17 C.F.R. § 240.153-4).
224. Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note 221.
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225
employed in the SEC's net capital rule.
Many of the larger broker-dealers opted for CSE status, including
226
Merrill Lynch, Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley.
The SEC allowed CSEs to operate with much less capital than
commercial bank conglomerates. 227 The CSE system freed up capital
for the large firms, but it also reduced their cushion for losses. 228
"Under the traditional [SEC net capital rule] rule, broker-dealers could
not exceed a 12-1 [leverage] ratio, but when Bear Steams became
insolvent, its debt-to-capital ratio was 33-to-1; at the time of its merger
agreement, Merrill's was reportedly 40-to-1. 2 29
The VaR models that allowed this increased leverage failed during the
subprime crisis because they relied on historical prices generated by a
rising market and overlooked a catastrophic event such as the subprime
crisis. These models did not allow for the hundred-year storm, "black
"fat
ail"230
swan," "fat tail" outliers that occurred during the subprime crisis.
And the rest is history. 23 1 The failures of Bear Steams, Lehman

225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2009).
226. In 2004, the General Accountability Office noted:
Mortgage-backed securities grew from about $1,123 billion in 1990 to about $3,796
billion in 2003, while other asset-backed securities grew by a factor of 12 over that same
period of time. Because the risk embedded in securitized assets can be structured and
priced so that financial institutions and others may be better able to manage credit and
interest rate risk with these instruments.
Because banks and insurance companies could reduce their capital requirements by
securitizing assets and removing those assets from their balance sheets, securitization was
also driven by changes in capital requirements implemented in these industries in the
early 1990s that required firms to hold more capital for certain assets.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S.

REGULATORY STRUCTURE 52 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0561.pdf (footnotes
omitted).
227. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 64, at 20.

228. John Sandman, CSE Program: A Failed Experiment, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.securitiesindustry.com/issues/19_86/23127-I .html
229. Id. Risk-based capital models were also adopted by the CFTC, but with better results
because they were tied to exchange margin requirements that more accurately valued risks. Minimum
Financial and Related Reporting Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing
Brokers, 69 Fed. Reg. 49,784 (Aug. 12, 2004).
230. Value at risk models failed to account for unusual market events. Those outliers were a well
known danger.

See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN, THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY

IMPROBABLE xviii (2007) (describing the dangers of events that have low predictability and large impact
and noting that portfolio managers use risk assessment measures that exclude the possibility of a black
swan). Some critics contend that the VaR risk management model is too deeply flawed to be of any use
in modeling risk. Pablo Triana, No Sense in Reforming VAR, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 2009, at
13.

231. It might be more accurate to say that the investment banks that used the broker-dealer Lite
system of calculating their capital through VaR models when they became consolidated supervised
entities are history.
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Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, as well as problems at Morgan Stanley,
were blamed on the fact that they had adopted the consolidated
supervised unity status.232 The SEC Inspector General also found that
the SEC failed to effectively oversee firms operating under CSE status
and to assure that they had sufficient capital.2 33
The SEC admitted on September 26, 2008, that its CSE program was
a failure and dropped it. 234 At that point, however, there were no
remaining CSEs to supervise. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley had
become bank holding companies. Bank of America had acquired
Merrill Lynch. Lehman Brothers and Bear Steams had both failed.2 35
But there was hope for the surviving banks. In February 2009, the new
Obama Administration announced that it would stress test the largest
nineteen banks to determine their survivability. The stress test sought to
determine whether the banks could survive the economy contracting
3.3% in 2009 and flat growth in 2010. The stress test would also test the
effects of an additional 22% drop in housing prices and an
232. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2008, at Al. Previously, the SEC had applied its net capital rule, a liquidity measure, to those firms. 17
C.F.R. § 15c3-1.
233. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 64, at 21.

234. Labaton, supranote 232. The SEC Chairman testified before Congress that:
When the Commission wrote the rules establishing the CSE program in 2004, they chose
to rely upon the internationally-accepted Basel standards for computing bank capital.
They also adopted the Federal Reserve's standard of what constitutes a "well-capitalized"
bank, and required the CSE firms to maintain capital in excess of this 10% ratio. Indeed,
the CSE program went beyond the Fed's requirements in several respects, including
adding a liquidity requirement, and requiring firms to compute their Basel capital 12
times a year, instead of the four times a year that the Fed requires.
Nonetheless, the rapid collapse of Bear Steams during the week of March 10, 2008
challenged the fundamental assumptions behind the Basel standards and the other
program metrics. At the time of its near-failure, Bear Steams had a capital cushion well
above what is required to meet supervisory standards calculated using the Basel
framework and the Federal Reserve's "well-capitalized" standard for bank holding
companies.
The fact that these standards did not provide adequate warning of the near- collapse
of Bear Steams, and indeed the fact that the Basel standards did not prevent the failure of
many other banks and financial institutions, is now obvious. It was not so apparent
before March of this year. Prior to that time, neither the CSE program nor any regulatory
approach used by commercial or investment bank regulators in the U.S., or anywhere in
the world, was based on the assumption that secured funding, even when backed by highquality collateral, could become completely unavailable. Nor did regulators or firms use
risk scenarios based on a total meltdown of the U.S. mortgage market.
The FinancialCrisis and the Role of FederalRegulators: HearingsBefore the H. Comm. on Oversight
at
available
(2008),
5
Cong.
110th
Reform,
Gov't
and
http://oversight.house.gov/imagesstories/documents/20081023100525.pdf (testimony of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
235. See Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskopf, Inside the Breakdown At the SEC, TIME, Mar. 9,
2009, at 34 (describing these failures and the SEC's failure to respond to this crisis).

580

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78

unemployment rate of 10.3% in two years. The banks with problems
would have six months to raise capital privately. Otherwise the
government would buy convertible preferred shares from the banks that
would pay a 9% dividend and would convert to common stock as capital
was needed from losses. This was the first step in inducing risk models
that would test for catastrophic risks.2 3 6
The government's stress test results for U.S. banks were disclosed on
May 7, 2009. Bank of America was found to need $33.9 billion in
additional capital; Wells Fargo required $13.7 billion; Citigroup $5.5
billion; and Morgan Stanley $1.8 billion. Those not needing additional
capital included JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Bank of New York
Mellon, and American Express. 237 Critics claimed that the government
had weakened its stress tests in response to demands from the banks that
were being tested. Among other things, the banks were allowed to value
distressed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by cash flow, rather
than marking them to market. Nevertheless, the test results seemed to
have restored the market's confidence in financial institutions, and the
banks needing additional capital were able to raise it in the market. 238
B. Long-Term CapitalManagement
When adopted, the CFTC viewed the SEC's broker-dealer Lite
program as an encroachment on its turf. In response, the CFTC
proposed to study whether it should expand its own jurisdiction over the
burgeoning OTC derivates market; both Congress and the industry
opposed the study. Additionally, Robert Rubin, the Secretary of the
Treasury, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and
Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, blasted the CFTC's proposal.23 9
In the midst of that contretemps, a huge hedge fund, Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM), which had been investing in derivatives,
236. Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, Treasury Sets Out Bank Test Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 26, 2009, at BI.
237. How the Stress Tests Stopped the Market Bleeding, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at Cl. The
Dow rose on that news to 8512.28, but it later appeared that the government had weakened its stress
tests in response to demands from the banks that were being tested. Morgan Stanley responded quickly
to the government's demand that it increase its capital through a $4 billion offering on May 8, 2009.
Wells Fargo raised $7.5 billion in equity on the same day. Even Citigroup was able to raise $2 billion
on May 15, 2009, through sale of non-government backed bonds. Bank of America also quickly raised a
large amount of capital. Jack Healy & Edmund L. Andrews, Bank System Is Healing, Geithner Tells
Senators, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at B3.
238. David Enrich et al., Fed Sees Up to $599 Billion in Bank Losses, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009,
at Al; Deborah Solomon, Nine Banks to Repay TARP Money Today, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at C3.

239. David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who's in Charge? Agency Infighting and Regulatory
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14.
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suffered massive losses in September 1998. Those losses raised
concerns that LTCM might fail and touch off a market panic. The
Federal Reserve Board intervened and pressured some large brokerdealers to infuse capital into LTCM to stop any panic-which they
did.24' The CFTC used that event to support its claim that it should
regulate OTC derivatives. 24 1 Congress did not accept the CFTC's
argument and responded in November 1998 with a legislative
moratorium that prohibited the CFTC from asserting regulatory control
of the OTC derivatives market. 242
C. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Congress directed the Presidential Working Group on Financial
Markets to study the OTC derivatives market and recommend whether
Congress should regulate it. That report was issued in 1999243 and was
followed by the CFMA, which 244 exempted OTC instruments from
regulation where the transactions' parties were sophisticated. The
exempted institutions included banks, investment bankers and other
financial institutions, pension funds, large businesses, and high net
worth individuals. The Treasury Department noted that:
The primary justifications for recommending

exclusion for such

transactions were a determination that most OTC financial derivatives

(e.g., interest rate swaps) were not susceptible to manipulation and that
the counterparties in such transactions did not need the same protections
as smaller, unsophisticated market Sparticipants
who relied on
245

intermediaries to conduct their transactions.

After its leadership changed, the CFTC abandoned its traditional
240. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (describing that event). The failure of LTCM raised concerns at the
Federal Reserve Board that it might present systemic dangers, and a rescue was arranged by the New
York Federal Reserve Bank in which several large investment banks invested funds in that hedge fund.
This created much controversy because it was thought that the Fed was signaling that it would rescue
any large investor caught in a liquidity trap or that was faced with unexpected losses. That rescue was
called the "Greenspan put." ETHAN S. HARRIS, BEN BERNANKE'S FED: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AFTER

GREENSPAN 71 (2008).
241. David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, On RegulatingDerivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C 1.
242. This bar was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act. It temporarily prohibited the
CFTC from issuing any interpretation of policy statements that would regulate activity in a hybrid
instrument or swap agreement. Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,431 (C.F.T.C. 1998).
243. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS
AND
THE
COMMODITY
EXCHANGE
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.

ACT

(1999),

available

at

244. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12,& 15 U.S.C.).
245. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 47.
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246
rules-based regulatory structure in favor of a principles-based system
The CFMA also created a multi-tiered derivatives market in which each
tier was subject to differing levels of oversight based on the nature of the
participants, the commodity traded, and the type of trading. The most
regulated tier was the traditional contract market where retail traders
participated, but even it was transitioned to a principles-based regimen,
which allowed the exchanges more control over their operations. The
CFMA did leave traditional "designated contract markets" (DCMs)
saddled with cumbersome regulatory requirements, while upstart
electronic execution facilities remained virtually unregulated.
The DCMs were required to continue as self- regulatory bodies in
conjunction with the NFA. 247 But the DCMs and the NFA did not
consolidate their self-regulatory activities, as did the NYSE and NASD
when they created FINRA. But the DCMs and NFA did form a Joint
Audit Committee to better monitor
and examine common member
248
merchants.
futures commission
The CFMA also exempted electronic trading facilities used by
institutional traders from regulation; these facilities were called "exempt
commercial markets" (ECMs). ECMs must restrict trading through their
electronic facilities to principal-to-principal transactions between
"eligible commercial entities." These eligible commercial entities are
large institutional traders, and include hedge funds that trade "exempt"
commodities, which included energy products, metals, chemicals, and
emission allowances. ECMs became popular and even challenged
traditional DCMs for market share.2 49

D. More OverlappingRegulation
Following the Enron scandal, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) brought a number of actions in California under its
power to regulate natural gas and electricity. 2 50 This raised concerns as
to whether the FERC was intruding into the CFTC's regulation area.

246. A New Regulatory Framework, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 28,036 (C.F.T.C. 2000).
247. Hearing to Examine Trading on Regulated Exchanges and Exempt Commercial Markets:
Hearing
Before
the
CFTC
(2007),
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/

groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opaarbitj_91807.pdf (testimony of Terry S.
Arbit, Gen. Counsel, CFTC).
248. Joint Audit Committee Operating Agreement, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,908
(September 11, 2008).
249. See Hearingto Examine Trading on RegulatedExchanges and Exempt Commercial Markets:
Hearing Before the CFTC, supra note 247 (testimony of Terry S. Arbit, Gen. Counsel, CFTC

(describing these facilities).
250. See MARKHAM, supra note 58, at 62. (describing those actions).
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Congress, however, encouraged FERC's efforts by passing the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, which expanded the FERC's powers to attack
energy price manipulations. 25 1 That legislation essentially adopted the
anti-manipulation language of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
rather than the Commodity Exchange Act's more complex and difficultto-prove language.25 2
It was undecided whether the FERC's jurisdiction extended to
transactions in the commodity futures markets, where the CFTC had
traditionally had exclusive jurisdiction. In October 2005, the CFTC and
FERC adopted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreeing to
refer to the other potential violations that were within the jurisdiction of
the other agency where futures contracts were involved in suspected
energy price manipulations. The FERC was also permitted to access
information from commodity exchanges if necessary for its
investigations.2 53
The MOU was in double jeopardy from regulatory actions by both
FERC and the CFTC. This proved to be the case in simultaneous
actions filed by both the CFTC and FERC against Energy Transfer
Partners L.P., which was charged with violating the antimanipulation
statutes-administered by both agencies-while trading natural gas.2 54
The advantage of two government agencies bringing actions against the
same company for the same conduct remains unclear. It is an especially
troubling policy because government agencies regularly claim they do
not have the resources to carry out their missions.
Despite the MOU, a related high-profile case created a jurisdictional
conflict between the CFTC and FERC. In September 2006, a large
hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, LLC, lost more than $6 billion during a
single week trading energy products.2 55 The CFTC and FERC brought
separate cases against Amaranth and two of its traders charging energy
price manipulation.25 6 The district court in the CFTC action noted:
"Hence, Amaranth is being pursued by two federal regulatory agencies

251.

Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.

252. See Markham, supra note 149, at 288-98 (describing the difficulties with the CFTC
manipulation standard).
253. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, 523 F. Supp.2d 328,
332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
254. Maya Jackson Randall, FERC Accuses Amaranth of Manipulation, WALL ST. I., July 27,

2007, at C6.
255. Jeanine Prezioso, Natural-Gas Futures End Session Mostly Lower, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,

2006, at 135.
256. The Amaranth affair is described more fully in Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For
Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L.
865, 879-80 (2008).

584

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78

in two separate proceedings in two different jurisdictions, based on the
same alleged conduct." 25 7 Amaranth claimed that the CFTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over manipulation claims in the futures markets,
but the FERC claimed that its jurisdictional mandate under the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 was not so limited. The district court refused to
enjoin the FERC action though it sympathized with the defendant's
plight. Another federal district court made a similar ruling in another
duplicative action by the CFTC and FERC.258
The Amaranth failure raised other issues. The New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) had forced Amaranth to reduce its positions on the
exchange before Amaranth's large loss, so using a regulatory arbitrage,
Amaranth shifted its positions to the unregulated market on the
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), an electronic exchange located in
Atlanta, Georgia.259 ICE had become a major global marketplace for
trading futures and OTC energy derivative contracts after Enron
collapsed. It operated an electronic trading platform for institutional
traders in the United States that was an ECM, and supposedly exempt
from CFTC regulation. But as energy prices spiked, and the size of
Amaranth's natural gas trading was revealed, ICE became a focal point
of regulatory concerns. Crude oil prices were also concerning. Oil
reached $70 a barrel on April 17, 2006, and then jumped to $75 a barrel,
pushing prices at the pump to more than $3 a gallon. Eventually, crude
oil peaked at $147.27 per barrel in July 2008,260 pushing gasoline to
more than $4 a gallon. 261
This price explosion set off shockwaves
262
throughout the economy.
In 2006, Congress directed the FTC to determine if gasoline refiners,
large wholesalers, and retailers had "price gouged" in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. Congress also instructed the FTC to investigate
whether gasoline prices nationwide were artificially manipulated by
reducing refinery capacity or by any other form of market manipulation.
The FTC's May 2006 report found no instances of illegal market
manipulation, but found fifteen examples of what initially appeared to
be "price gouging." Other factors, however, such as regional or local
257. Amaranth Advisors, 523 F. Supp.2d at 331-32.
258. See Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 527 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2007).
259. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STAFF REPORT: EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET 6

(2007).
260. S&P 500 Drops Into Bear Market, supra note 4.
261. Jad Mouawad, Bright Sliver in Grim Economy as Energy Prices Take a Break, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 2008, at Al.

262. Russell Gold & Guy Chazan, ForBig Oil Firms,a Silver Lining, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008,
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market trends, appeared to explain those prices. 263 The FTC report also
stated that any federal gasoline price-gouging legislation would be
unenforceable and could cause more problems for consumers than it
would solve. The report also concluded that competitive market forces
should determine the price of gasoline at the pump, but the FTC's
explanation that market forces were driving energy prices was
ignored.264
Although the FTC seemed uninterested in pursuing an energy witch
hunt, a GAO report in 2007 on derivative trading in the energy markets
questioned the CFTC's oversight ability.2 65 Congress responded by
granting the FTC overlapping authority to prosecute false reporting and
market manipulation in the wholesale petroleum market. 266 This
charged three agencies with regulating trading in the energy marketsthe CFTC, FERC, and FTC, as well as the Justice Department for
criminal prosecutions.
Concerns continued as energy prices peaked in 2008 and led to an
interagency task force to determine what was driving up crude oil prices.
The CFTC chaired that task force, which included representatives from
the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, and Treasury, as well as the
Federal Reserve Board, FTC, and SEC. The task force, which released
its report in July 2008, concluded that oil price increases between 2003
and 2008 were largely the result of supply and demand, rather than
speculation. The report found that the crude oil futures market grew
significantly during that period, but the agencies preparing the report did
not find support for the proposition that speculative activity had
systematically driven changes in oil prices.26 7 The task force also
confirmed the obvious, that an imbalance between supply and demand
led to price increases.2 68 This conclusion did not satisfy some members
of Congress, who continued to blame unknown speculators and
bogeymen for the phenomenal rise in energy prices.

263. FED.TRADE COMM'N, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE MANIPULATION AND POSTKATRINA
GASOLINE
PRICE
INCREASES
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/060518PublicGasolinePriceslnvestigationReportFinal.pdf.
264. Id.
265. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRENDS IN ENERGY DERIVATIVES MARKETS RAISE
QUESTIONS ABOUT CFTC'S OVERSIGHT (2007).

266. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, §§ 811-815, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat.
1492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 17301-17305 (2006)).
267. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMMODITY MARKETS, INTERIM REPORT ON CRUDE OIL
(2008).
268. Id.
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E. Enron Loophole
The CFTC asked Congress for more regulatory authority over ECMs,
and expanded reporting requirements over ECMs. 269 The CFTC was
particularly interested in the ECMs because of their growing role in the
high-profile energy markets. The ECM exclusion was often referred to
as the "Enron loophole," or "Enron exemption," because it was inserted
into the CFMA at the last minute through Enron's lobbying efforts,
which was seeking to protect its popular electronic trading platform,
EnronOnline, from regulation. 270 After Enron imploded, the exemption
became suspect. Though other trading operations exploited the ECM
exemption to create a viable OTC institutional trading market-as
demonstrated by ICE's success-the lack of regulation in those markets
made them suspicious.
Congress closed the Enron loophole through amendments included in
the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008.271 The amendments may be
referred to as the "ICE amendments" because of concerns with trading
in energy contracts on that exchange raised by the Amaranth regulatory
arbitrage. The new amendments sought to close the Enron exemption by
subjecting ECMs to CFTC position limits, recordkeeping requirements,
and large trader reporting requirements where the CFTC determined that
an ECM was trading a "significant price discovery contract" (SPD). A
SPD is a contract traded on an otherwise exempt ECM that has a price

269. Market Growth Trader Participation and Pricing in Energy Futures Markets, Com. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 130,451 (CFTC 2007). The new CFTC chairman Gary Gensler, appointed by the Obama
Administration disavowed the CFTC's conclusion that market forces not speculators were creating
volatility in the energy markets. He proposed position limits on the size of trading. Kara Scannell &
Sarah N. Lynch, CFTC Hopes to Tame Rocky Energy Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010 at C3;
Dwight Cass & Lauren Silva Laughlin, Energy Traders on the FiringLine, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at
B2.
270. See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 259, at 41, 44. Enron played a leading role in pushing the
commodity markets toward electronic trading. EnronOnline was launched in 1999 as an Internet trading
platform for energy products. EnronOnline provided real-time quotes posted by Enron traders for
wholesale customers. There was no human interface in the transactions effected on EnronOnline.
Enron acted as a principal in the transactions being quoted, which provided Enron with a considerable
competitive advantage because no one outside the company was aware of the spreads being charged by
the Enron traders. In 2000, Enron Online made 548,000 transactions with a notional amount of $336
billion. MARKHAM, supranote 58, at 62.
271. The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 was enacted as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation,
and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill), Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008). That legislation was
passed over a presidential veto on May 22, 2008. Because of a clerical error, however, one of the titles
in the bill was inadvertently omitted in the version vetoed by the President. An embarrassed Congress
then voted to present a complete version of the legislation to President Bush and it was passed over his
second veto on June 18, 2008. Congress passes farm bill over Bush veto, CNN, June 18, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/18/farm.bill/index.html.
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linkage to contracts traded on a regulated contract market or is used as a
material price reference to price transactions in the underlying
commodity.2 72
The ICE amendments required the CFTC to monitor trading in SPDs.
The legislation now regulates ECMs trading SPDs in much the same
manner as regulated contract markets. The ECM must comply with nine
core principles that, among other things, requires ECMs to take steps to
prevent price manipulation, provide information to the CFTC upon
request, adopt rules imposing speculative position limits, and publish
daily price and volume information on SPDs. Large traders on an ECM
trading in SPDs are also required to report their trades to the CFTC.27 3
VI. MARKET CONVERGENCE
A. Toward a Single Market
Because the CFTC and SEC are widely viewed as failed regulators,
merging them may be like merging two failing businesses in the hope
that it would make one strong entity. Combining failure with failure
does not seem like a formula for success. Perceptions that the agencies
are failures suggest that regulatory reform is necessary. And merging
failing entities does have a favorable effect where over capacity is an
issue. But a more compelling reason for consolidating the two agencies
is that the markets regulated by the CFTC and SEC have converged.
This convergence has been underway for sometime.
The Brady
Commission found that, by 1987, the two markets were interrelated and
reactive to each other.274 Additionally, financial products underlie most
trading on commodity futures exchanges.2 75 The Treasury Blueprint
merger recommendation was based on its belief that because of the
"convergence of the futures and securities markets," the SEC and CFTC
276
should be consolidated into a single agency.
The CFMA also supported convergence when it addressed trading in
single stock futures. Futures trading was previously proscribed on
single stocks because of SEC concerns that such instruments could be
used to manipulate the underlying stock's price, but Congress eventually
272. Significant Price Discovery Contracts on Exempt Commercial Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,888,
75,891 (Dec. 12, 2008) (proposed rules).
273. Id.
274. MARKET MECHANISMS, supra note 192, at vii.

275. Susan Carey & Joseph T. Hallinan, Chicago Exchanges Combine Thunder-MergerMay Set
the City's Status as the Derivatives Showplace, Ending a Century-Old Rivalry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,
2006, at CI.
276. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 106.
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reached a compromise that allowed single stock futures to be traded
under joint regulation by the SEC and CFTC.27 7 Now single stock
futures trading is handled jointly by broker-dealers on securities
exchanges and futures commission merchants on commodity exchanges.
Further evidence of a convergence is found in the CFTC approval of
the designation of Island Futures Exchange, LLP (now the Inet Futures
Exchange, LLC) as a contract market in February 2002, allowing it to
trade single stock futures. 2 78 That entity was affiliated with the Island
electronic securities trading platform.
The CBOE, traditionally
regulated as a securities exchange, created a DCM subsidiary in 2004
(CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC), which trades futures contracts based
on "variance" and "volatility"--a particularly popular product during the
height of the subprime crisis. The CFTC regulates that DCM.2 79
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, another exchange traditionally
regulated by the SEC, created a DCM subsidiary, the Philadelphia Board
of Trade, that trades currency and financial futures in sector indexes; it
was acquired by NASDAQ, renamed the NASDAQ OMX Futures
Exchange, and trades IDEXTM USD (interest rate swap futures), world
currency futures, and sector index futures. 2 80 NASDAQ OMX created
an energy-trading platform in October 2008.281 NYSE-Euronext created
a subsidiary, NYSE Liffe, LLC, which, in turn, purchased the CBOT's
precious metals futures operations after the merger of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the CBOT with the NYMEX, which
had a competing precious metals futures business. 282 NYSE-Euronext
also planned to expand its futures offerings to include various
indexes.283
B. Avoiding a Merger
That the markets converged, on its face, seems to support merging the
277. Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4853, 45
SEC Docket 2030 (Sept. 26, 2001).

278. The Island Futures Exchange was dually registered as a national securities exchange with the
SEC. Acknowledgement of Receipt of Notice of Registration as a National Securities Exchange
Pursuant to Section 6(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the Island Futures Exchange, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-47407, 79 SEC Docket 2025 (Feb. 26, 2003).
279. See Steven R. Strahler, CBOE to found futures exchanges, CHI. Bus., Jan. 27, 2004,
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=l 1317.

280. See
Nasdaq
OMX,
NFX
Overview,
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/
Micro.aspx?id=PBOToverview.
281. Doug Cameron, Nasdaq to Get In on Emissions Contracts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at C5.
282. NYSE
Euronext,
NYSE
http://www.nyse.com/futuresoptions/nyseliffe/121 1983444453.html.
283. What's News, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009, at Al.
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regulation of the markets. But even before the Treasury Blueprint was
published both the SEC and CFTC were laying the groundwork to
support their jurisdiction. The two agencies announced a memorandum
of understanding in March 2008 for coordinating their activities to avoid
duplication and unnecessary costs. 284
This agreement was in
anticipation of the Treasury Blueprint-which was issued a few weeks
later-and in the hope that it would defuse the Treasury's
recommendation to combine the two agencies.
The SEC and CFTC also agreed to principles for how to regulate new
financial instruments, so that past jurisdictional strife would not be used
to justify consolidation.2 85 Pursuant to that agreement, the CFTC and
SEC jointly acted in June 2008 to allow trading of options (regulated by
the SEC) and futures (regulated by the CFTC) on exchange-traded funds
(ETFs) that were traded on stock exchanges regulated by the SEC.2 86
This was rare cooperation between the two agencies. Typically, as one
industry leader has noted:
Any novel derivative that hints of a futures contract must be vetted by the
SEC and the CFTC as to its legal status. The result often is an
interminable delay as the two agencies try to decide which has
jurisdiction over the product.
For example, our exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
filed a proposal in June 2005 with the SEC to trade options on exchangetraded funds that invest in gold. The proposal has gone nowhere because
the SEC and CFTC are still trying to decide, more than two years later,
who should regulate the product. Markets overseas do not have this
problem and, as a result, often
trade new derivative products long before
28 7
they are available in the U.S.
This cooperation did not last long. Attitudes hardened as the
subprime crisis worsened and regulators came under criticism.
Inexplicably, the credit default swap (CDS) market touched off a war
over regulatory jurisdiction. A CDS is an agreement by one party to
make a series of payments to a counterparty in exchange for a payoff, if
a specified credit instrument goes into default. A CDS can be used as a
form of insurance against a default from that credit instrument. It can
284. Full Committee Hearing to Consider the Following Nominees to CFTC Positions:Hearing
Before the S.

Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition &

Forestry,

10th

Cong.

2, available at

http://216.40.253.202/%7Eusscanf/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc-download&gid= 13
(testimony of Walter Lukken).
285. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC, SEC Sign Agreement to Enhance Coordination, Facilitate
Review
of
New
Derivative
Products
(Mar.
11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/generalpressreleases%20/2008/pr5468-08html.
286. Exemption Letter, 2008 WL 351339 (CFTC Jan. 29, 2008).
287. William J. Brodsky, A Real Regulatory Redundancy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2007, at A19.
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also be used for speculation on whether a default will occur. During the
subprime crisis, concerns arose over defaults and systemic dangers from
this opaque market because the CDS market had an outstanding notional
amount of $55 trillion in 2008.288
The failure of Bear Steams was blamed on CDS exposures. When it
failed, Bear Steams had an estimated $2.5 trillion in outstanding
CDSs. 289
Lehman Brothers' failure raised additional concerns that
CDSs written on its debt obligations could generate catastrophic claims.
Early estimates were that $400 billion in CDSs were written on Lehman
Brothers debt, but in the end only $6 billion was paid to protection
buyers.290 Although there were no disastrous problems from the
Lehman Brothers failure in the CDS market, 291 the U.S. government had
to rescue American
International Group (AIG) and pay AIG's massive
2 92
CDS obligations.
Before he was replaced, SEC Chair Christopher Cox requested
legislation to allow the SEC to regulate the CDS market and provide
"transparency"-a watchword for regulation. 293 But no one could
explain how transparency could have prevented the subprime crisis.
Worse still, nobody asked that question, but simply clamored for
transparency without asking whether it would prevent future crises. In
response to default concerns, federal regulators began pressuring the
industry to form a central clearinghouse to guarantee performance and
transparency.294 This soon turned into a competition among the larger
exchanges to grab this market by creating a central clearinghouse.2 95
Swap dealers supported the effort to create a credit default swap
clearinghouse and pledged to have such a facility in place by year-end

288. Carrick Mollenkamp, et al., Lehman's Demise Triggered Cash Crunch Around Globe, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al.
289. Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2008, at BUI.
290. Deborah Lynn Blumberg, It's Wait and See for Bond Traders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2008, at
C2.
291. L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, Credit Panic: Stages of Grief WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2008, at
A 17; CreditDefault Swamp, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2009, at A8.
292. Carrick Mollenkamp, et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failedto Pass Real-World Test,
WALL ST. J. Nov. 3, 2008, at AI.

293. See Christopher Cox, Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at
WKI2.
294. The new Obama Administration was reported to be preparing a proposal to require such
clearing. Stephen Labaton, Obama Plans FastAction To Tighten FinancialRules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,

2009, at Al.
295. Doug Cameron & Kara Scannell, Regulators Back System to Clear Credit Swaps, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 24, 2008, at CI; Sarah N. Lynch & Jacob Bunge, ICE's Swaps Plan Is Advancing, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 14, 2009, at C14.
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This process was soon bogged down in jurisdictional fights

among the SEC, CFTC, and New York Federal Reserve Bank. Though
these entities accepted a memorandum of understanding in November
2008 that was supposed to settle their differences, 297 the process
298
remained mired by the need to obtain multiple regulatory approvals.
Finally, the SEC again intruded on the CFTC's turf after Birmingham,
Alabama's county government lost $200 million on interest-rate swaps
in February 2008. The SEC sued Larry Langford, the Mayor of
Birmingham, for accepting more than $150,000 from a friend who was
an employee of an investment banking firm that received $6.7 million in
fees from swap contracts and municipal bond offerings by the city. The
case was the SEC's first enforcement action involving security-based
swap agreements.299
VII. THE CFTC AND SEC--CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

A. Basisfor Differences

The vast cultural divide between the regulatory approaches taken by
the CFTC and SEC became clear even before the CFTC was created. In
1968, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that floor traders
("locals") had time and place advantages over the public traders using
the markets. The GAO noted that the SEC had required the securities
exchanges to create plans to eliminate floor traders, an action taken after
an extensive study by the SEC. The GAO urged the Commodity
Exchange Authority to conduct a similar study. The Commodity
Exchange Authority resisted that request, but did eventually conduct a
small study on the NYMEX, concluded that floor traders were providing
a valuable price-stabilizing function on that commodity exchange and
296. Jacob Bunge & Doug Cameron, Crisis on Wall Street: ICE to Buy Clearing Corp. As Big
Banks Support Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at C2.
297. Doug Cameron & Jacob Bunge, Crisis on Wall Street: Regulatory Troika Heads Off Swap
Turf War, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2008, at B6. The New York insurance department was also seeking to
regulate credit default swaps, but backed off that plan as momentum for a federally regulated
clearinghouse grew. Sarah N. Lynch, Crisis on Wall Street: New York Will Suspend Its CDS Plan,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at C2.
298. The agencies continue to clash.
For example, when Sentinel Management Group experienced problems this summer, the
SEC and the CFTC clashed in court as to how to dispose of client funds held by Sentinel.
The judge in the matter asked, "Why doesn't this agency of government go over and talk
to this [other] agency of the government and get your act together, for crying out loud?"
Brodsky, supra note 287.
299. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Langford, Litigation Release No. 20545, 93 SEC Docket 416 (April
30, 2008).
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were not dominating the market.
Consequently, the Commodity
Exchange Authority
concluded that further action on such concerns was
30 0
unnecessary.
This cultural divide became clearer after the CFTC was created. The
Commodity Exchange Authority used Department of Agriculture
lawyers to handle its cases. The CFTC, therefore, had to create its own
30
legal staff, and it recruited a number of SEC and SEC alumni lawyers. 1
But the pro-regulatory stance of those SEC-trained lawyers conflicted
with the hands-off regulatory attitude of the Commodity Exchange
Authority staff and the commodity futures exchanges.
That culture clash was epitomized by an effort by the former SEC
lawyers to convince the CFTC to pass customer protection rules that
would have included, among other things, a requirement that futures
brokers not recommend transactions that were not "suitable" for
customers. This was a centerpiece of the SEC's regulation of brokerdealers in the securities industry. After much industry opposition, the
CFTC rejected that proposal. Instead, it required futures commission
merchants to provide customers with a one-page risk disclosure
document that warned of the dangers of commodities contracts and
advised prospective customers to consider whether they were suitable
for such transactions.
This placed the suitability burden on the
customer, rather than the broker.30 2
Other significant differences in their regulatory approach would make
integrating the SEC and CFTC into a single agency difficult. Prime
30 3
among those differences are their diverging views on margin.
Congress included a provision in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that allowed the Federal Reserve Board to set stock margin levels, and it
directed the SEC to enforce those requirements. 30 4
The Fed
subsequently issued Regulation T, which set most stock margins at 50%.
Although the federal government has tried to impose control, margins on
300.
301.
302.
303.

MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 51-52.
The author was one of those lawyers.
MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 56-65.
The Treasury Blueprint notes:

In general, margin is a very different concept in the futures and securities worlds. In the
securities context, margin means a minimum amount of equity that must be put down to
purchase securities on credit, while in the futures context margin means a risk-based
performance bond system which acts much like a security deposit. With respect to
portfolio margining, the CFTC and the SEC are in agreement in principle, but have been
unable to overcome certain legal impediments and philosophical differences to agree on a
single approach.
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 116.
304. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2006).
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futures contracts are set by the exchanges, not the government. The
futures industry has stoutly resisted efforts to impose federal controls
over margin and continued to do so during the subprime crisis, even as
energy and other commodity prices skyrocketed.3 °5
B. Other Differences
The SEC has concentrated much of its enforcement efforts on
stopping insider trading, albeit without much success. Insider trading
was previously legal under state laws, 30 6 and the SEC did not argue that
federal securities laws prohibited it. But in 1961, SEC Chair William
Carey established that insider trading was illegal, through a settlement in
an SEC administrative proceeding with Cady, Roberts & Co.307 In that
action, the SEC required "equal access to information" for all traders,
and the violation of such as the basis for its insider trading charges.
That theory ignores the fact that access to information in the real world
is asymmetrical. The SEC, nevertheless, used that 1961 settlement as
leverage to sell its "equal access" theory to the Second Circuit, which
eagerly accepted it.30 8 Although the Supreme Court was not so
accepting of the equal access theory, 30 9 it did eventually adopt the
SEC's hastily improvised "misappropriation theory" as an alternative for
prosecuting insider trading. 310 Insider trading has since become a
centerpiece of the SEC's regulatory program.
In contrast to the SEC, the CFTC, after conducting a congressionally
mandated study on insider trading in the commodity markets, concluded
311
in 1984 that it would not pursue the SEC's course for insider trading.
This was because most information used in trading derivatives involves
"market" information, rather than inside information about a public
corporation. The CFTC believed that traders should freely use such
market information to better price commodities. The CFTC recognized
that market information is asymmetrical and believed that better pricing
305. Markham, supranote 199, at 101-23.
306. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933). Compare Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d
186 (7th Cir. 1978) (no insider trading prohibition in Indiana, even today) with Diamond v. Oreamuno,
248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969) (New York court created insider trading prohibition).
307. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 49 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
308. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
309. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
310. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
311. CFTC, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS
POSSESSING MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC INFORMATION (1984).
The CFTC also rejected the SEC's
misappropriation theory in that report, but later brought an action against two traders who were stealing
information from their employer concerning trading plans that had market effect. Commodity Futures

Trading Comm'n v. Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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was more likely when traders are induced by the possibility of profit to
bring the information into the market by signaling with their trades.
That view was
adopted by 2008 amendments to the Commodity
3 12
Exchange Act.

The Treasury Blueprint noted other distinctions in the two agencies'
regulatory approaches. For example, customers of broker-dealers
regulated by the SEC are protected by the SIPC, which insures account
balances and up to $500,000 from losses caused by the broker-dealers.
There is no such protection in the futures industry. Indeed, the CFTC
rejected such account insurance as unnecessary 313 because futures
industry customers are protected in bankruptcy by priority over other
creditors for funds held in segregated accounts.3 14

There are also cultural differences that divide the securities and
derivatives industries. The derivatives industry, led by the commodity
futures exchanges in Chicago, has long resisted regulation. The
commodity markets were virtually unregulated under the Commodity
Exchange Authority and only lightly regulated after the CFTC was
created-at least compared with the securities industry. The futures
industry culture advocates free enterprise and market discipline and
opposes government regulation.
In contrast, the securities industry has embraced regulation and
generally supported the SEC, which has developed a large network of
alumni that promote its regulatory approach. Many securities industry
participants believe that regulation lends credibility not otherwise
available. Futures industry participants generally do not believe that
they need intrusive regulation to gain credibility. Rather, the futures
industry would rather have that burden self-imposed by a freely
competitive environment that would economically punish wrongdoers
more efficiently than government regulators. The Chicago Mercantile
Exchange even portrayed itself as a bastion against communism in one
advertising campaign.
Combining the SEC and CFTC raises other concerns. The SEC has
historically viewed securities markets as one-sided-buy side. In
312. The amendments stated that nothing in the antifraud provision in the Commodity Exchange
Act section should be read to require any person to disclose "nonpublic information that may be material
to the market price, rate, or level of the commodity or transaction, except as necessary to make any
statement made to the other person in or in connection with the transaction not misleading in any
material respect." 7 U.S.C. § 6b(b) (2006). This amendment appears to take the approach adopted by
the Supreme Court in 1817 when it held that inside information need not be disclosed about a
commodity being bought and sold, but prohibited affirmative misrepresentations. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15
U.S. (2 Wheat) 178 (1817).
313. MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 10.
314. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 117.
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contrast, futures traders recognize that markets go up and down. Short
sellers are viewed to be as important as the long sellers in the price
discovery process in the commodity markets.315 In contrast, the SEC
has historically viewed short selling as inherently manipulative. 316 That
view led to another embarrassment for the SEC during the subprime
crisis when it restricted short selling. 317 For years the SEC had imposed
3 18
a "tick test," allowing short sales only on an uptick in a stock's price.
The SEC dropped that requirement when it adopted Regulation SHO in
2004.319 This move away from the tick test was generally considered an
advance for the SEC in recognizing that markets may be traded on both
long and short sides. But during the subprime crisis, large investment
banks such as Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Bear
Steams claimed that short sellers were knocking down their stock prices.
315. Not everyone agreed with this position. Members of Congress sought to limit or abolish short
selling during consideration of the legislation that became the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 . See
80 CONG. REc. 7857 (1936) (remarks of Senator Murray); H.R. REP. No. 72-1551 (1932).
316. As the Treasury Blueprint noted:
A short sale in the securities context is usually depicted as a risky bet that stock prices
will decline. Moreover, some observers contend that heavy short-selling deliberately to
drive down the price of a stock may constitute manipulation. In contrast, short selling in
the futures context is generally viewed as a necessary and critical component of liquidity
in the futures markets. Although the risk profile of short selling is similar in both the
futures and securities contexts (price declines mean profitability for the short, while price
increases mean unlimited potential losses), the SEC imposes extensive restrictions on the
practice while the CFTC imposes few.
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 117. The Dutch banned the practice of short selling 300 years
ago, and it was attacked by Napoleon.VII, Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
3197-98 (3d ed. 2003). Ironically, Germany passed a statute in 1896 that prohibited futures trading
because of concern that short selling was depressing agricultural prices. Id. at 3198; see also William P.
Rogers & Jerry W. Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to United States Commodity
Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Policies, 19 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 273 (1987)
(discussing effects of that statute on American firms). That statute was not repealed until the end of the
last century. Its repeal then allowed a German exchange, Eurex, to become the largest futures exchange
in the world, wresting that title from the Chicago exchanges, until their recent merger. Peter A. McKay,
The Futures Are Now, As Eurex Is Cleared For Trading in U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2004, at C6.
317. The SEC defines a short sale as:
A short sale is the sale of a security that the seller does not own or any sale that is
consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.
In order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short seller will borrow the security,
typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor. The short seller later closes
out the position by purchasing equivalent securities on the open market, or by using an
equivalent security it already owned, and returning the security to the lender. In general,
short selling is used to profit from an expected downward price movement, to provide
liquidity in response to unanticipated demand, or to hedge the risk of a long position in
the same security or in a related security.
Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004).
318. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2009).
319. Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,008.
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Critics also charged that short sellers had undermined Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and AIG.32 °
As these complaints mounted, the SEC began attacking "naked
shorts" in the press, These were short traders who sold without having
located the securities to borrow. 32 1 As the crisis worsened in September
2008, the SEC curbed naked short selling in the stock of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, as well as seventeen financial services firms, including
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan
Stanley.322 The SEC temporarily banned short selling in 799 financial
stocks on September 19, 2008, after Lehman Brothers failed.323
SEC Chair Cox later said he regretted banning short selling and that
he did so only after intense pressure from Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke. Cox's
complaint further undermined the SEC's credibility, and raised
questions about the SEC's independence and strength-especially
because traders claimed that those restrictions had only further
destabilized the market. 324 Whether that is true, the SEC's ban on short
selling threatens derivative traders who sell short to hedge, and routinely
speculate as a part of their business. Mary Schapiro, the new SEC chair,
has suggested she might turn back the clock and reinstate the SEC's old
up-tick rule. Though Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernake
supported her in that effort, 325 it has not been met with universal
approval.326

C. Single Stock Futures
The derivative market has more reason to resist a merger between the
SEC and CFTC since the advent of single stock futures. Chicago is the
leading single stock futures exchange in the United States. It was
created through a joint venture of the CBOE, CBOT, and CME. 327 It
320. Vikas Bajaj et al., Markets Soar, But New Rules Upset Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
at Al.
321. Jenny Anderson, Shares Revive Amid Confusing Signs From S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2008, at C1.
322. S.E.C. Extends Short-Sale Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at C5.
323. Vikas Bajaj & Graham Bowley, S.E.C. Temporarily Blocks Short Sales of FinancialStocks,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/20sec.html.
324. Traders Group Faults SEC Over Decision on Short Selling Ban, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 85 (Jan. 19, 2009).
325. Bernanke Repeats Opposition to Outright Nationalizationof Banks, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 341, 342 (Mar. 2, 2009).
326. SEC's Depression-Era Uptick Rule Said Irrelevant to Modern Marketplace, 41 See. reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 413 (Mar. 9, 2009)
327. OneChicago, Exchange Introduction, http://www.onechicago.com/?page-id=1 14.
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should have been a sterling example of convergence between the two
industries, but it has remained relatively minor because the SEC has
insisted on its own brand of regulation for trading these new
instruments. Most futures contracts have initial margins of less than 5%
of the notional amount of the contract. The SEC, however, mandated a
margin of 20% for single stock futures. This discouraged trading in
single stock futures in the United States, and as a result, South Africa
now hosts the largest single stock futures exchange. 328 This experience
raises concerns that if the SEC and CFTC are combined the SEC will
renew its assault on exchange-set margins on all commodities futures
and other derivative instruments. This would329discourage speculation, to
the detriment of price discovery and hedgers.
Single stock futures are another example of how overbearing SEC
regulation can be in practice. Not only did the SEC insist on a
suitability requirement for single stock futures, 330 it also imposed a
prospectus-like requirement. As one author observed:
The CFTC had mandated a single page risk disclosure document for
futures contracts it regulates as a substitute for the "suitability" doctrine
imposed by the SEC. However, the SEC concluded that traders in single
stock futures needed both the protection of a suitability requirements and
additional disclosures. Perhaps, the SEC thought that traders of such
products are particularly stupid people. The result was a twenty-six page
disclosure statement, rather
331than the single page disclosure form used for
all other futures contracts.
VIII. OTHER OBSTACLES

TO MERGER

A. Jurisdictionof CongressionalCommittees
Historical and political factors also make a merger between the SEC
and CFTC difficult, if not impossible. Perhaps the largest obstacle is
that the banking committees in Congress oversee the SEC, while the
agricultural committees oversee the CFTC. The agricultural committees
will be reluctant to cede jurisdiction to the banking committees, even
though that jurisdictional divide is the result of a historical accident.
The agricultural committees focused on the commodity exchanges when
regulation was first considered because their operations directly affected
328. Lawrence Hunt Jr., The Paulson Report is a Non-Starter, 67 FINANCIER WORLDWIDE 53
(July 2008).

329. Id.
330. MARKHAM & HAZEN, supranote 38, at § 10:17.

331. Hunt, supranote 328, at 53.
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the prices of crops.
Congressional banking committees had no interest in the commodity
futures exchanges in the 1930s when the regulatory system was
established because those exchanges only traded agricultural
products. 332 That situation has changed dramatically as financial
instruments came to dominate the derivatives markets. That change did
not diminish the agricultural committees' interest. Those committees are
under the sway of the Chicago exchanges and will not willingly cede
their jurisdiction to the banking committees.
Soundings from the agriculture committees after the Obama
Administration took office also evidenced no interest in giving up their
jurisdiction to the banking committees. To the contrary, they seem bent
on retaining that jurisdiction. 333 Collin Peterson, Chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee, said that the SEC had "done a poor job" of
regulating and that "[t]aking something that is working-like the
CFTC's oversight of the futures markets-and moving it to another
place where things are not working is, frankly, crazy." 33 4 Indeed,
skirmishes over the role of the CFTC began early in 2009, after the
House Agriculture Committee voted to give the CFTC expanded
authority over derivatives. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee, opposed that bill. He wanted to limit the
Agriculture Committee's jurisdiction to instruments involving "edible"
commodities, leaving his Financial Services Committee to regulate
everything else.
The Agriculture Committee, not surprisingly, rejected that
proposal.335 Frank then decided to place the SEC-CFTC merger aside,
declaring that he was putting systemic-risk regulation as his top
priority. 36 He had initially deferred consideration of a merger to the

332. The distinctive nature of the two markets before the advent of financial derivatives is
illustrated by the Commodity Exchange Authority's advice to Congress in 1946. That bureau stated that
it saw no reason to coordinate its activities with those of the SEC because most of the firms that it
regulated were partnerships, rather than public corporations that the SEC regulated. The Commodity
Exchange Authority also noted that there was a provision in the CEA that prohibited it from disclosing
to the SEC the names of any traders who might be involved in any activity that might be in violation of
the federal securities laws. The Commodity Exchange Authority asserted that, in any event, it had

witnessed no such activity. MARKHAM, supra note 150, at 39-40.
333. Lawmakers'Attention Continues to be Focused on Speculation, OTC Clearing,41 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 128 (Jan. 26, 2009).
334. Peterson Says CFTC Only Regulator Suited to Oversee Mandated OTC Clearing,41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (CCH) 230, 231 (Feb. 9, 2009).
335. Kara Scannell, DerivativesOversight Spurs House Turf Battle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at
A4.
336. Frank Puts Systemic Risk Regulation at Top of FinancialRegulatory Reform Goals, 41 Sec.

Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 206 (Feb. 9, 2009).
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second half of 2009, but he took it off the agenda entirely in March of
that year.33 7 Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd
338
agreed with that priority.
President Obama announced in February 2009 that he was seeking
expedited action from Congress on regulatory reform, which would
include, among other things, "more-uniform supervision of financial
products." 339 The President outlined seven principles for designing a
new financial regulatory structure, including uniform regulation of
financial products that would prevent "cherry picking among competing
regulators." 340 That the Administration vastly increased the budget of
the CFTC for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, though, suggested a view
toward permanency.
The Administration also announced in
preparation for the Group of 20 meeting in London in March 2009 that it
would focus on enhancing the powers of the Federal Reserve Board for
addressing systemic risk concerns from large financial institutions. This
seemed to signal that a SEC-CFTC merger would have to await those
complex reform proposals, which will likely include higher capital
requirements and perhaps even regulation of large hedge funds-all of
which will undoubtedly be hotly contested.34 2
In May 2009, word began to leak that the Obama administration was
focusing on creating a single bank regulator and a single investor
protector regulator. But SEC Chair Schapiro opposed removing the
SEC's consumer protection mission to another agency, so the SEC was
exempted from that proposal.34 3 It was also reported that, while the
Obama Administration supported a merger of the CFTC and SEC, it was
not prepared to take on a fight between the banking and agriculture
committees. 344 Still another report stated that the SEC and CFTC chairs

337.
Reg. & L.
338.
Reg. & L.

Groups Favor Systemic Risk Oversight; Frank Schedules Several Related Hearings,41 Sec.
Rep. (BNA) 393 (Mar. 9, 2009).
Systemic Risk Should Be Initial Focus in Bid for Regulatory Reform, Dodd Says, 41 Sec.
Rep. (BNA) 201 (Feb. 9, 2009).

339. Gregg Hitt, Next Front: Bank Regulation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A2.
340. Obama Lists Key Principlesfor Reform of Nation's FinancialRegulatory System, 41 Sec.

Reg. & L. Rep. 335 (Mar. 2, 2009). The other principles were "serious oversight" of large institutions
posing systemic risk; reform of the present regulatory structure; transparency; accountability;
comprehensiveness; and recognition of the global nature of financial services. Id.
341. Obama Signs '09 Funding Bill for SEC, CFTC; Latter Agency Gets Dramatic Increase, 41
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 448 (Mar. 16, 2009).
342. Damian Paletta, U.S. to Toughen FinanceRules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at Al.
343. Jim Kuhnhenn, Fed Would Serve as Risk Regulator Under Obama Plan, AssocIATED PRESS,
May 27, 2009.
344. Damian Paletta, Single-RegulatorPlan For Banks Now Close, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at
A2; Damian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Financial Overhaul Raises Questions, WALL ST. J., May 29,
2009, at A2.
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had reached an agreement in May 2009 to divide their jurisdiction.
They agreed to give the SEC control over derivatives related to publicly
traded securities and credit default swaps, leaving the CFTC with
jurisdiction over derivatives related to other products. The agreement,
however, raised more questions than it answered.3 45 For example, did it
mean that the SEC would assume jurisdiction over futures on indexes
traded on exchanges, or did the agreement apply to OTC derivatives
only?
B. Industry Opposition
Opposition to merging the SEC and CFTC from the derivatives
industry must also be considered. Proposals to merge the SEC and
CFTC have surfaced over the years and each time the futures industry
beat them back. Favorable and unfavorable views on the merger from
industry participants were, at least initially, split by market, with the
securities industry generally favoring merger and commodity markets
opposing.34 6 The force of the commodity market's opposition should
not be underestimated. The CME, which now controls virtually all
regulated futures trading in the United States after merging with the
CBOT and the NYMEX, has effectively captured its regulator, the
CFTC.
It will not willingly relinquish that control to a more
independent SEC-style regulator. The CME also exerts strong influence
over the agriculture committees in Congress, and the majority whip,
Senator Dick Durbin, hails from Chicago, as does President Obama.
Consequently, the CME will have a decisive voice in the debate over
345. Stephen Labaton, An Overhaul of Financial Rules is Taking Shape, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2009, at B 1.
346. One commentator noted:
CME Group, the National Futures Association, NYSE Euronext, the New York
Mercantile Exchange, the Futures Industry Association, the Managed Funds Association,
and two individual commentators favored the current system of separate regulators for
the futures and securities markets. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association, Penson GHCO, Deutsche Bank, the Institute of International Bankers, the
CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, the Options Clearing Corporation,
Deutsche Borse AG, and two individual commentators favored combining the CFTC and
the SEC. The London Investment Banking Association, the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, the American Bankers Association and American Community
Bankers, the International Council of Securities Associations, and the Financial Services
Roundtable did not take a position on the merger, but argued that the United States
should adopt a principles based regulatory regime. The North American Securities
Administrators Association opined that a principles based regime would not improve the
United States' financial markets.
Jerrold E. Salzman & Fitzgerald T. Bramwell, SEC/CFTC MergerIs It Still the Same Debate, 28 Fut. &
Derv. L. Rep. II (Jan. 2008).
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merger.
In 1992, the CME proposed consolidated regulation of all financial
services in a department-level body. 34 7 That proposal would have
subjected all financial services to the same level of regulation. It would
have allowed financial service firms to compete on the products and
services they offer, instead of the costs and limitations they incur dealing
with their various regulators. That proposal, however, was a nonstarter
because it would have eliminated the SEC's independence and placed
regulation in a department under the President, subject to political
influence.
The CME has become less flexible over the years. It has already
opposed the Treasury Blueprint's merger recommendation. 348 In a letter
to the Treasury Department, the CME stated:
Differences among various financial markets will remain, despite any
apparent convergence of some financial products. For example, the
futures market is for the most part, a professional market, with
institutional and commercial participants, and relatively few retail
investors. This is in contrast to the nature of the participants in the
securities, banking and insurance markets. Futures products are highly
347. Hunt, supra note 328. As one author notes:
The CME's proposal was first partially unveiled by Jack Sandner, the CME's chairman,
in October 1992, who offered as its principal justification that the current regulatory
system "leads to pure gridlock in trying to deliver products to the user." The CME's
proposal would consolidate in a single, cabinet-level department a host of existing
agencies in addition to the SEC and the CFTC: the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and certain functions of the Federal Reserve
Board and the Department of Labor. In its own words, the proposal seeks, above all, a
level playing field--namely, a functional system of regulation "so that financial products,
services and markets delivering similar benefits and risks can be subjected to
substantially equivalent regulation and so that economic competition, rather than
jurisdictional barriers or differences in supervision, can determine which products,
services and markets succeed in the marketplace." The new agency would be known as
the Federal Financial Regulatory Service (FFRS or Agency) and would be administered
by a board of nine commissioners, each appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, with the chairperson having cabinet-level rank. The Agency would, however, be
radically decentralized with each of the nine commissioners being individually
responsible for administration of a specified operating division of the FFRS. In this
sense, the FFRS is less a single agency than a financial cabinet within which largely
autonomous agency heads would collectively make financial policy. In short, this
proposal's real goal (which is in no way disguised) is less merger of units than
coordination of financial regulatory policies.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition versus Consolidation: The Significance of OrganizationalStructure in
Financialand SecuritiesRegulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 451-52 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
348. See Letter from Craig Donohue, CEO, CME Group, Inc to the Treasury Dep't (Nov. 21,
2007) (on file with author).
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leveraged and are likely to be more complex than many products in other
types of financial markets. The methods of trade execution and clearing
differ among the futures, securities and banking industries, and have no
relevance to the insurance market.
Accordingly, these separate markets should continue to be regulated
by separate agencies. A merger of the CFTC and the SEC would stifle
innovation and competition in the futures industry, and would not benefit
either industry with respect to the goals articulated by the Treasury
Department. Putting the regulators of these very different markets under
one roof would only create a larger, more inefficient
bureaucracy, and
349
would not enhance global market competition.
The CME also criticized the SEC's regulatory approach, citing its
restrictions on the CBOE over the years as an example of how regulation
can stifle innovation. 350 The CME did urge the Treasury Department to
push the SEC toward the principles-based regulation approach used by
the CFTC.35 1 The Treasury Blueprint adopted that recommendation.35 2
C. Advocates for Merger
There are advocates of merging the SEC and CFTC. Significantly,
353
the Obama Administration has repeatedly supported such a merger.
But the Administration's support is not guaranteed because the President
hails from Chicago and will be strongly lobbied by that city to protect
the CME, one of its most important industries. The Financial Services
Roundtable, composed of the larger financial services firms, has also
voiced support for a merger. 354 The Investment Company Institute
(ICI), one of Washington's more powerful lobbying groups has
supported a proposal to create a new Capital Markets Regulator that
would take over the SEC's and CFTC's functions. The ICI asserted that
such a regulator would provide a "big picture" oversight of financial
products.35 5
Before leaving office, SEC Christopher Chairman Cox had
announced his support of a merger with the CFTC.35 6 The acting
349. Id. at 3.
350. Id. at 8.
351. Id. at 10-11.
352. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 106-11.
353. Frank Puts Systemic Risk Regulation at Top of Financial Regulatory Reform Goals, supra
note 336.
354. Financial Services Roundtable Says Fed Should Oversee Stability of FinancialSystem, 41
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 202 (Feb. 9, 2009).
355. ICI Issues Reform ProposalCallingfor Risk CapitalMarket Regulators, 41 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 396 (Mar. 9, 2009).
356. Dwight Cass, ProjectingCalm Amid the Chaos, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 27, 2008, at B2.
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Chairman of the CFTC stated a few weeks later that both the CFTC and
the SEC should be abolished and replaced by three new regulatory
bodies that would focus on risk, market integrity, and investor
protection. 357 Later, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar complicated the
process by urging Congress to give the SEC jurisdiction over all
financial products. Aguilar said that any merger with the CFTC should
be conditioned on applying SEC-style regulation.358 Gary Gensler, the
Obama Administration's pick for the CFTC Chair was equivocal in his
confirmation proceedings about a merger, probably in deference to the
agriculture committees and CME. Gensler said that "[a] merger . . .
makes sense only if it enhances our ability
to carry out the important
359
tasks with which the CFTC is entrusted.,
Mary Schapiro, the new SEC Chair, who previously served both as a
CFTC Chair and SEC Commissioner, brings a new dynamic to the
equation. With her experience, Schapiro appears to be an ideal fulcrum
for combining the two agencies. Schapiro has been quoted as saying
that financial services regulation was a "spaghetti bowl" of regulators,
and questioned the sense of two regulatory agencies. 360 Nevertheless,
she too has cautioned against a "monolithic regulator '3 61 and has
advocated preserving the present SEC regulatory structure, which would
be a threat to the commodity industry if a merger occurs.36 2 Schapiro

has also promised a return to the heavy-handed enforcement tactics of
prior SEC administrations. She even wants to
re-impose regulating
363
hedge funds and further regulate rating agencies.
D. Principles-BasedRegulation
Merging the SEC's and CFTC's cultures will pose serious problems
to developing a consistent regulatory approach. 364 The Treasury
357. Karen Scannell, CFTC's Chief: 3 Regulatorsfor 2, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at C3.
358. Aguilar Urges Functional Regulation; Merged Agencies Should Favor SEC Model, 41 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 156 (Feb. 2, 2009).
359. Gensler Says Chief Goalas CFTC Chairman Would be Reforming FinancialRegulations, 41
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 230 (Feb. 9, 2009).
360. Brodsky, supra note 287.
361. Witnesses Testify to Regulatory Gaps; Schapiro Warns of 'Monolithic' Regulator, 41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 549 (Mar. 30, 2009).
362. Schapiro Vows to 'Reinvigorate' Enforcement at SEC if Confirmed, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 77 (Jan. 19, 2009).
363. Labaton, supra note 294, at Al. Two sector working groups created by the Presidential
Working Group issued reports in January 2009 that sought to head off regulation of the hedge funds by
advocating a "best practices" approach. President's Working Group Panels Issue Best Practicesfor
Hedge Fund Investing, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 107 (Jan. 26, 2009).
364. For a description of such harmonization see Carlucci, supra note 195.
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Blueprint recognized that concern and sought to alleviate it by
advocating that the SEC convert to a principles-based regulatory system,
like the CFTC.3 65 The Blueprint also faults the SEC's delays in
approving rule changes by stock exchanges. A constant criticism of the
SEC is that delays in approvals needed for new products stifles
innovation and competition. In that regard, the Blueprint recognized
that the CFTC allows exchanges to self-certify that their rule changes
comply with regulatory requirements and places the burden on the
CFTC to hold otherwise. 366 This too was an effort to make a merger
more palatable to the futures industry.
Those recommendations, even if implemented, are probably not
enough to obtain the futures industry's support for a merger. There
remains concern that the SEC will superimpose any principles-based
regulation it adopts over its existing overly intrusive rules-based
structure. This will mean an additional layer of regulation, not less
regulation. In addition, any SEC principles will likely be couched in
broad terms. This will allow the SEC to invent the law ad hoc, and
charge that any conduct it does not like violates its principles and push
traders to offshore financial services.
In February 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce weighed in with a
proposal that argued attention to the SEC's enforcement failures
overlooked other problems at that agency. The Chamber suggested
revamping the SEC's management structure and hiring personnel
knowledgeable about the financial services regulated by the SEC. Like
the Blueprint, 367 the Chamber advocated a more streamlined decision
making processes for no-action letters, exchange rule approvals, and
exemptions from the Investment Company Act of 1940.368
The markets historically regulated by the SEC and CFTC are
effectively extinct; electronic trading is replacing the trading floors of
the NYSE and the Chicago commodity futures. This eliminates the
agencies' concerns with how to regulate floor traders with a time and
place advantage that they can use to exploit investors. 369 Also
concerning was the widespread failure of risk models used under Basel
II by the banks, consolidated supervised entities once supervised by the
SEC and by the rating agencies.

365. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at i 1.
366. Id.
at 111-12.
367. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 111-13.
368. Chamber of Commerce Recommends Changes Toward More Effective SEC, 41 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 294 (Feb. 23. 2009).
369. See generallyMarkham & Harty, supra note 256 (describing this phenomena).

2009]

MERGING THE FTC AND CFTC
E. PracticalConcerns

The Treasury Blueprint also noted practical distinctions between the
SEC and CFTC. For example, the SEC is largely funded through fee
collection from market participants and congressional appropriations;
the CFTC is funded entirely by congressional appropriation.37 0 This is
because an effort to impose "user fees" to fund the CFTC was beaten
back by the industry in 1982. The industry thought it was bad enough
that it was saddled with the CFTC and did not want to pay for it too. 37'
The CFTC again proposed user fees in 2008, claiming that the industry
was benefiting from regulation and should pay for it. Doubtless the
industry disagrees, and this proposal has not advanced.3 72
It is also unclear whether a merger will significantly reduce costs to
taxpayers. Because the CFTC's operating staff is already overstretched,
any savings in redundancies would be through cuts in the "Executive
Direction & Support" part of the budget; this was about 26% ($30
million) of the CFTC's proposed $116 million budget for 2008. Even a
50% reduction in staff from redundancies with SEC administrators
would save only a little more than $17 million. 373 Initially offsetting
even those meager savings would be costs incurred in merging the two
agencies' headquarters and branch offices. There would be other
expensive integration costs. 3 74 The GAO suggested in 1995 that there
could be enforcement advantages from a merger, but conceded that there
would still
be a need for specialized attorneys and investigators for each
3 75
market.
370. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 118.
371. Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, "Sunset" on the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission: Scene 11,39 BUS. LAW. 67, 80-81 (1983).
372. Commodity Futures Trading Commission'sAbility to Regulate Markets is on Trial, AGWEEK,
July 15, 2008.
373. COMMODITY

FUTURES

TRADING

COMM'N,

FY

2008

PRESIDENT'S

BUDGET

AND

PERFORMANCE
PLAN
43
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2008budgetperf.pdf.
374. For a description of the difficulties that a merger of the two agencies may encounter see Paul
M. Architzel & Jason E. Wynn, Blueprintfor Reform: Is a Choice-of-Regulator MOU A Better Interim

Solution?, 28 Fut. & Derv. L. Rep. 1 (June 2008).
375. The GAO stated:

Merging CFTC and SEC could yield a number of potential enforcement benefits such as:
enhanced inter-market surveillance and enforcement activities, increased opportunities
for training, additional resources to pursue futures related violations, and elimination of
ambiguity about which agency has enforcement responsibility over derivative products.
However, regardless of whether the agencies are merged or not, there would still be the
need for attorneys and investigators with some specialized skills and expertise in futures
and securities laws and markets.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CFTC/SEC ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS: STATUS AND POTENTIAL
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IX. REFORMING REGULATORY POLICY
A. PoliticalConsiderations
More than the existing haphazard, ineffective, and punitive regulatory
approaches taken by the SEC and CFTC is needed. The Treasury
Blueprint recommends an objectives-approach instead of functional
regulation. It also seeks to reorganize financial services regulation to
reflect that financial services are no longer sold through firms that
specialize in only one product, such as banking, securities, or
derivatives. It is unclear, however, how merging the SEC and CFTC
would provide better regulatory protection, without consolidating all
financial services business practices regulation into a single body.
Regulatory reform should focus on more efficient and effective
regulation, rather than compromises to satisfy the SEC and CFTC. Yet
the problems encountered in the financial markets during the subprime
crisis place almost irresistible pressure to impose more inefficient
regulations. Political considerations can never be avoided-and should
not.
But in this crisis rationality should be the driving criteria for
regulatory reform. This requires an examination of the core causes of
the subprime crisis, most of which have little or no relation to the
missions of either the SEC or CFTC.
B. Defects in Policy
The subprime crisis was largely caused by the Federal Reserve
Board's interest rate policies, which fed the residential real estate
bubble. The Federal Reserve Board under Alan Greenspan tried to use
interest rates to regulate the overall economy. This began with low
interest rates after a near-recession in the early 1990s. The availability
of easy money set off a stock market bubble that Greenspan initially
ignored, but he then became alarmed as it grew in intensity. Greenspan
tried to deflate the bubble by demonizing it ("irrational exuberance")
and increasing interest rates until the market broke and the economy was
crippled.376 This event is known as the dot.com bust that occurred at the

IMPACT OF A MERGER 1 (1995).

376. This mode of attack was approved by John Maynard Keynes, an English economist who
stated that: "The proper object of dear money is to check an incipient boom." LIAQUAT AHAMED,
LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 237 (2009).

Interestingly, Keynesian

views on using government spending to stimulate the economy in a downturn had been viewed to be
outmoded in the Greenspan era, a view that changed dramatically during the subprime crisis with the
adoption of a $787 billion stimulus package. Daniel Henninger, EarmarkNation, WALL ST. J., May 14,
2009, at A 15.
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end of the 1990s.
The bubble burst in 2000, hammering the economy and leaving the
new President George W. Bush with a nasty economic situation. 377 The
Fed then desperately slashed interest rates to restore the economy, but
that set off another bubble, i.e., the residential real estate bubble that led
to the current crisis. The process then repeated; the Fed raised interest
rates until that bubble burst. In fact, the Fed raised interest rates
seventeen consecutive times. That not only broke the back of the
residential real estate market, but smashed the economy, nearly forcing
it into a depression not seen since the 1930s. The Fed is now repeating
this cycle by cutting interest rates to near zero. 378 It should abandon this
strategy or adopt something more predictable
and rational, such as a
379
targeted rate adjusted only for inflation.
Government policies contributed to other core causes of the subprime
crisis. For example, government policies pushed the investment banks
into the subprime market and legitimized the risks of such instruments
and flawed fair value accounting requirements. The SEC must accept
some responsibility for these actions, which caused financial institutions
to value subprime-related assets at fire sale prices, thereby undermining
380
their financial stability and causing a loss of confidence in the market.
The present regulatory policies also failed during the subprime crisis.
Current regulatory policy demands punitive and poorly reasoned
legislation as a reaction to the burst market bubble and its exposure of
abusive practices such as Enron and WorldCom. SOX is the prime
example for why this approach has the inevitable result of punishing the
innocent, imposing unnecessary burdens and costs on legitimate
business, and impairing U.S. businesses' ability to compete abroad,
without corresponding benefits.381

377. I have described those events in MARKHAM, supra note 58.
378. E.S. Browning, Too Much Hope May be Pinned on Rate Cut, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at
Al. Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke must bear equal responsibility for destroying the economy with
these interest rate increases. Many market participants thought that when Bemanke took office it would
be "one and done," meaning that he would raise interest rates one more time before stopping. HARRIS,
supra note 240, at 32. However, that did not prove to be the case. Bemanke raised rates three more
times and paused for over a year between June 2006 and September 2007 before making a series of rate
cuts through December 2008 that gradually brought rates to near zero. See Fed. Reserv Bd., FRB:
Monetary Policy, Open Market Operations, http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm.
379. Jerry W. Markham, Give Paulson a Chance, EXECUTIVE VIEW, July 1, 2008,
http://www.executiveview.com/knowledgecentre.php?id=2 100 (describing this phenomena).
380. I have addressed these shortcomings in Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis-Some
Thoughts on a "Sustainable" and "Organic" Regulatory System, 4 F.I.U. L. REv. 381 (2009). FASB
did give some relief on fair value accounting in April 2009. Francesco Guerrera, et al., Accounting
Windfallfor Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), April 2, 2009, at 15.
381. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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SOX cost American businesses billions of dollars without any
measurable positive result. It was punitive, costly legislation that was
intended to stop accounting manipulations at public companies where
restatements had become epidemic.382 Tellingly, despite its crippling
competitive effect, SOX did not diminish the number of accounting
restatements. 383 Indeed, a record number of restatements took place in
2006.384 Additionally, despite claims that registration of hedge funds
would prevent and detect fraud, Bernie Madoff s registration had no
such effect. Rather he carried out the largest investment fraud in history
right under the SEC's nose.
The federal government also regulated the ratings agencies after the
Enron-era scandals as punishment for not downgrading Enron until just
before it failed.385 That regulation did nothing to affect the rating
agencies' faulty AAA ratings of subprime debt that gave such toxic
instruments broad market acceptance. The rating agencies downgraded
thousands of issues of subprime mortgage securitizations that they had
previously given high ratings. For example, in July 2007, Moody's cut
ratings on CDOs valued at $5 billion. Between July and August 2008
alone, Moody's downgraded nearly 1,000 issues valued at $25 billion.
By February 2009, there
were 16,000 downgrades worldwide, over 90%
386
CDOs.
were
of which
Regulatory policy also includes high-profile prosecutions brought by
the SEC, Justice Department, and ambitious New York attorneys
general, such as Eliot Spitzer or Andrew Cuomo. Particularly in New
York, prosecuting financial services executives is a means for ambitious
prosecutors to gain fame and higher public office, e.g., Eliot Spitzer,
Rudy Giuliani, and now Andrew Cuomo. Federal regulators also use
prosecutions to deflect criticism of their failure to prevent or detect the
misconduct or problems that lead to scandal or market panic. The worst
scandals emerge in market downturns, which is called market discipline.
This is more effective than after-the-fact prosecutions by ambitious
prosecutors.
Those prosecutions inevitably involve showy press conferences, dawn
382. See supranote 121 and accompanying text.
383. SUSAN SCHOLZ, THE CHANGING NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC COMPANY
FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS (1997-2006) 1 (2008); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
UPDATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

ACTIVITIES (2006) (describing causes of increasing restatements).
384. David Reilly, Restatements Still Bedevil Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7.
385. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, § 4, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)) required the rating agencies to register with the SEC and gave
that agency rule making authority to govern their business practices.
386. Paul J. Davies, Half ofAll CDOs ofABS Failed,FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 2009, at 25.
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raids on executive homes, and shackling executives for their "perp"
walks. Because prosecutors' cases are often weak and difficult to prove,
they try to coerce guilty pleas. For example, prosecutors often indict
employees on multiple counts that will result in life imprisonment unless
the employee pleads guilty to lesser charges and testifies against higherups. Prosecutors also indict family members to force a guilty plea from
387
their executive relatives. No tactic is too low for prosecutors.
Companies were even required to waive their attorney-client privilege
and limit attorney fees to avoid indictment and destruction. Only after a
lecture from a federal judge did the Justice Department retreat from
388
some of these tactics.
Policymakers should consider what these prosecutions accomplish.
They do not have a deterrence effect. Fraud and scandals continue in
ever-increasing numbers. Yet following the subprime crisis the CFTC
has petitioned Congress to grant it authority to bring criminal
prosecutions. 389 If adopted other agencies would seek the same powers,
which would lead to more highly publicized prosecutions
and
390
headlines.
for
vie
regulators
the
as
abuses,
prosecutorial
Class action lawyers feed on this prosecutorial frenzy, filing strike
suits on behalf of union pension funds whenever a public company
announces bad news. These lawsuits allow class action lawyers to
garner a handsome profit and improve the pension funds' returns at the
expense of other shareholders. They accomplish nothing else-except
to distract management. The subprime crisis has all ready set off
another round of class action lawsuits.
The Reserve Primary Fund, the money market fund that broke-thebuck in September 2008 because of exposure to Lehman Brothers' debt,
is a good example of this system's abuses. The Reserve Primary Fund
held $64 billion when it collapsed. Only $785 million of that amount
was invested in Lehman notes. The Reserve Fund's biggest loss turned
out to be a $3.5 billion reserve set up to cover the costs of regulatory
actions and investor lawsuits. That reserve, if expended, would reduce
investors' final recovery to 91.72 cents on the dollar. 39 1 Fortunately,
387. Markham, supra note 379.
388. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing indictments); see also
United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (suppression of statements made by
defendants because of coercion in the form threats of job termination).
389. Javier Bias & Joanna Chung, CFTC Seeks Authority in Crime Cases, FIN. TIMEs (London),
Feb. 27, 2009, at 5.
390. As predicted, an SEC commissioner was seeking such authority for the SEC in March 2009.
Aguilar Call for Enhanced SEC Enforcement, Including Authority to Bring Criminal Action, 41 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 492 (Mar. 23, 2009).
391. Diana B. Henriques, Lehman Loss Just the Startfor Money Fund, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2009,
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common sense prevailed and that litigation was cut off by a federal
of most of the customers' funds, but only after
judge, allowing a payout
392
year.
a
over
of
a delay
X. CONCLUSION

Functional regulation is a failure. It is broken beyond repair and
should be abandoned. The Enron-era scandals, subprime crisis, and
Madoff scandal evidence its failure.
Enron should have taught
policymakers that punitive legislation and prosecutions are not rational
responses to financial problems. A carefully reasoned approach to
regulation is necessary. The Treasury Blueprint has made that effort.
Many market participants will not agree with all of its recommendations,
but it is at the least, a good starting point. More importantly, the
Blueprint evidences that financial regulation can be objective and
reasoned, rather than a blood sport for ambitious prosecutors and
politicians.
The proposal to merge the CFTC and SEC appears reasonable on its
face, particularly if the SEC can be persuaded to shift to principles-based
regulation. But that merger would be unwise if the SEC continues its
culture of discouraging speculation through high margin requirements
and short sale restrictions. A merger would severely damage or drive
away derivatives trading. The two agencies' cultural differences must
also to be melded in areas such as insider trading and risk disclosures. It
seems doubtful that the SEC would accede to such changes, and the
agricultural committees in Congress are unlikely to cede jurisdiction
absent such changes. So the status quo will most likely prevail.
The SEC and CFTC should become financial regulators instead of
law enforcement agencies. The two agencies now act as legislature,
prosecutor, judge, and jury in their administrative proceedings. This
creates an unhealthy adversary relationship with the regulated. A
financial regulator should make rules and leave enforcement of those
rules to others. This recommendation conforms with ongoing efforts to
create a single business practices regulator that would separate law
enforcement and attack abuses across product lines.
The CME's 1992 proposal may have been correct, and that
recommendation should be revisited: A Department of Finance would
leave financial regulators to watch for problems, to make risk
assessments, and to track industry changes and problems so that they can
at B9.
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be dealt with before becoming a crisis. Industry and government should
develop risk models that account for the disasters that will inevitably
occur. This does not mean abandoning risk-taking. This would be a
mistake because society cannot advance without taking risks. Rather a
Department of Finance would mean that risks will be better appreciated
before capital is massively committed to a particular program. Financial
regulation would also include examiners who would review the
operations and financial status of systemically important financial
institutions on an ongoing basis.
Finally, restructuring financial
regulation should consider the effects of government policy initiatives,
whether it be encouraging subprime lending, or raising interest rates to
stop speculation.
Perhaps most importantly, policymakers should
address the root causes of the subprime crisis before changing the
existing regulatory structure.

A
Az

